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ABSTRACT
Cyber systems are ubiquitous in all aspects of society. At the same time, breaches to
cyber systems continue to be front-page news (Calfas, 2018; Equifax, 2017) and, despite more
than a decade of heightened focus on cybersecurity, the threat continues to evolve and grow,
costing globally up to $575 billion annually (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2014; Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013; Microsoft, 2016; Verizon, 2017). To address possible impacts
due to cyber threats, information system (IS) stakeholders must assess the risks they face.
Following a risk assessment, the next step is to determine mitigations to counter the threats that
pose unacceptably high risks. The literature contains a robust collection of studies on optimizing
mitigation selections, but they universally assume that the starting list of appropriate mitigations
for specific threats exists from which to down-select. In current practice, producing this starting
list is largely a manual process and it is challenging because it requires detailed cybersecurity
knowledge from highly decentralized sources, is often deeply technical in nature, and is
primarily described in textual form, leading to dependence on human experts to interpret the
knowledge for each specific context. At the same time cybersecurity experts remain in short
supply relative to the demand, while the delta between supply and demand continues to grow
(Center for Cyber Safety and Education, 2017; Kauflin, 2017; Libicki, Senty, & Pollak, 2014).
Thus, an approach is needed to help cybersecurity experts (CSE) cut through the volume of
available mitigations to select those which are potentially viable to offset specific threats.
This dissertation explores the application of machine learning and text retrieval
techniques to automate matching of relevant mitigations to cyber threats, where both are
expressed as unstructured or semi-structured English language text. Using the Design Science
Research Methodology (Hevner & March, 2004; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, &
Chatterjee, 2007), we consider a number of possible designs for the matcher, ultimately
selecting a supervised machine learning approach that combines two techniques: support vector
machine classification and latent semantic analysis. The selected approach demonstrates high
recall for mitigation documents in the relevant class, bolstering confidence that potentially
viable mitigations will not be overlooked. It also has a strong ability to discern documents in
the non-relevant class, allowing approximately 97% of non-relevant mitigations to be excluded
automatically, greatly reducing the CSE’s workload over purely manual matching. A false
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positive rate of up to 3% prevents totally automated mitigation selection and requires the CSE
to reject a few false positives.
This research contributes to theory a method for automatically mapping mitigations to
threats when both are expressed as English language text documents. This artifact represents a
novel machine learning approach to threat-mitigation mapping. The research also contributes
an instantiation of the artifact for demonstration and evaluation. From a practical perspective
the artifact benefits all threat-informed cyber risk assessment approaches, whether formal or ad
hoc, by aiding decision-making for cybersecurity experts whose job it is to mitigate the
identified cyber threats. In addition, an automated approach makes mitigation selection more
repeatable, facilitates knowledge reuse, extends the reach of cybersecurity experts, and is
extensible to accommodate the continued evolution of both cyber threats and mitigations.
Moreover, the selection of mitigations applicable to each threat can serve as inputs into
multifactor analyses of alternatives, both automated and manual, thereby bridging the gap
between cyber risk assessment and final mitigation selection.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
Cyber systems1 are ubiquitous in all aspects of society. At the same time, breaches to
cyber systems continue to be front-page news (Calfas, 2018; Equifax, 2017) and, despite more
than a decade of heightened focus on cybersecurity, the threat continues to evolve and grow,
costing globally up to $575 billion annually (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2014; Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013; Microsoft, 2016; Verizon, 2017). Symantec reported that
“Cyber attackers revealed new levels of ambition in 2016, a year marked by extraordinary
attacks, including multi-million-dollar virtual bank heists, overt attempts to disrupt the US
electoral process by state-sponsored groups, and some of the biggest distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks on record powered by a botnet of Internet of Things (IoT) devices”
(Chandrasekar et al., 2017).
Regrettably, subsequent years have not been less exciting on the cybersecurity front
(Symantec, 2019; Verizon, 2017). The Cisco 2018 Annual Cybersecurity Report identifies a
number of recent changes in the threat landscape which continue to impact growth of the
mitigation landscape. For example, self-propagating malware has moved to the network where
it can spread very rapidly. In addition, adversaries continue to improve their abilities to evade
existing security measures. Also, supply chain threats are on the rise and mitigation strategies
against them are immature. Moreover, the years 2017 and 2018 saw a dramatic rise in
ransomware along with rapid adoption of cloud and Internet of Things technologies for which
mitigation strategies remain in the early stages (Cisco Systems, 2018).
To address possible impacts due to cyber threats, information system (IS) stakeholders
must assess the risks they face. To that end, there is an extensive body of research and practice
in the cyber risk assessment discipline. Many mature organizations employ formal risk

1

Definitions of cyber terms are provided in Appendix A. In this paper, we use the term “mitigation”
synonymously with “countermeasure” and “security control” to mean a tool or technique that may counter a
cyber threat.
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assessment methodologies in an attempt to achieve rigor, although ad hoc approaches are also
used. We briefly discuss a selection of risk assessment methods in the Literature Review section
below. These methods help stakeholders identify and prioritize cyber risks. After completing
the risk assessment, in whatever form, stakeholders may have a better understanding of threats
to their mission-critical IS assets.
Following risk assessment, the next step is to determine mitigations to counter the
threats that pose unacceptably high risk, but this is challenging for several reasons. First, cyber
threats and the means to counter them continue to proliferate (Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2014; Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013; Microsoft, 2016; Verizon, 2017).
Consequently, the universe of documents describing cyber threats and potential mitigations is
quite large and continually growing but there is currently no comprehensive source of threatmitigation mappings. For example, NIST 800-53 (National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2017) is a well-known catalog of security control documents often referenced
during the mitigation stage of cyber risk assessment. While it contains valuable knowledge,
NIST 800-53 does not relate mitigations to specific threats, and thus, does not deter application
of mitigations that over- or under-address the actual threats. On the other hand, the National
Intelligence Cyber Threat Framework is a comprehensive threat framework, but it does not
currently offer mitigation mappings (National Security Agency, 2018). The Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) is another threat framework (MITRE, 2017a).
While CAPEC does contain a few representative mappings of mitigations to threats, these have
been manually generated by cybersecurity experts, they are not all-inclusive, and mitigation
selection is not the primary intent of the CAPEC framework. Second, over-applying mitigations
wastes resources while under-applying or incorrectly applying mitigations, leaves residual risk
and can result in a false sense of security. Third, to propose sensible mitigations one must
acquire detailed cybersecurity knowledge. In current practice, knowledge about mitigations and
threats is primarily contained in documents. This knowledge resides in numerous, highly
decentralized sources, which are often deeply technical in nature and are primarily described in
textual form, resulting in dependence on human experts to interpret the knowledge for the
specific context.
To date, manual selection by cyber security experts continues to be the de facto method
for identifying mitigations to cyber threats. Several issues arise from reliance solely on manual
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selection by experts for cybersecurity mitigation decisions. First, cybersecurity experts continue
to be in short supply relative to the demand, while the delta between supply and demand
continues to grow (Center for Cyber Safety and Education, 2017; Kauflin, 2017; Libicki et al.,
2014). In addition, the time-consuming nature of manual matching necessarily limits the
number of sources of possible mitigations that can be consulted during any cyber risk
assessment. Moreover, human variation in expertise and in sources consulted can lead to uneven
and non-repeatable application of the available knowledge (Bolger & Wright, 1994; Hallberg,
Bengtsson, Hallberg, Karlzén, & Sommestad, 2017; Holm, Sommestad, Ekstedt, & Honeth,
2014).

Problem Statement and Research Gap

Figure 1. Research Gap
In this research, we set out to fill the research gap illustrated in Figure 1 by devising a
method for matching mitigations to cyber threats expressed as English language text documents
using machine learning and text retrieval techniques in support of cyber risk assessment. A
fundamental goal of all cyber risk assessments, whether methodical or ad hoc, is to identify the
threats faced in a particular environment with enough detail that specific, applicable mitigations
can be determined, prioritized, and implemented. The first step in a cyber risk assessment is to
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assess the cyber risk of the system by considering the threats against it. The output of this step
is a list of high priority threats to be mitigated. The next step is to determine candidate
mitigations to address the threats. As discussed above, this is difficult and has inherent issues
of scalability, consistency, and repeatability because, absent automation to help match
mitigations to threats, mitigation selection is primarily a manual process done by human experts
using disparate textual sources. There are two dimensions to the mitigation selection problem.
The first is a technical dimension, that is, for each threat, enumerating a set of possible
mitigations that are capable of countering it. The second, optimizing mitigations, is an
organizational dimension where budgetary and other organizational constraints necessitate
winnowing the list of potentially applicable mitigations to those that are organizationally
feasible. Our research focuses on the first dimension and is distinct from the second dimension.
The literature contains abundant research on the second dimension, herein referred to as
mitigation optimization but also sometimes called trade space or analysis of alternatives. We
briefly discuss a selection of mitigation optimization methods in the Literature Review section
below. These approaches universally assume that the applicable set of potential mitigations for
input into the mitigation optimization analysis has already been determined; however, cyber
risk assessment approaches stop short of providing this list of potential mitigations leaving
a gap. This dissertation addresses the gap by developing an automated method for matching
mitigations to threats to obtain the initial set of potentially relevant mitigations. It is distinct
from the mitigation optimization problem which commences after the initial list is made and
forms the reservoir from which downstream risk-informed mitigation and mitigation
optimization analyses can draw.

Objectives and Intended Contributions of the Project
The objective of this research project is to investigate the application of machine
learning and text retrieval techniques for matching mitigations to cyber threats where both are
expressed as unstructured or semi-structured English language text. We hypothesize that we
can devise an automated or semi-automated method that has the potential to reduce workload
for the CSE by recommending possible mitigations for a given threat when both are English
language documents. We use Fedorowicz’s definition of “document” as “a chunk of
information, usually dealing with a relatively limited topic or subject area.” (Fedorowicz, 1996)
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Significant research exists both in threat-informed cyber risk assessment methodologies
and mitigation optimization techniques. This research project addresses the gap between these
two areas as described in the prior section. To that end, we investigate applicable text mining
techniques from the machine learning and document-driven decision support systems (DSS)
disciplines, assess to what degree these techniques apply to the domain of cyber threats and
mitigations, look for domain-specific peculiarities, and recommend changes in how
cybersecurity practitioners describe threats and mitigations to support the use of automated,
document-matching schemes.
The primary contribution of this research to theory is the artifact, a novel machine
learning method for matching mitigations documents to threats. We also provide instantiations
of the method for demonstration. From a practical perspective, an automated approach to
matching mitigations to threats benefits all threat-informed cyber risk assessment approaches
by aiding decision-making and reducing workload for cybersecurity experts whose job it is to
mitigate the identified cyber threats. Moreover, an automated approach can support
development and maintenance of a knowledge base to make mitigation selection more
repeatable, facilitate knowledge reuse, and extend the reach of cybersecurity experts. The
approach will be extensible to accommodate the continued evolution of both cyber threats and
mitigations. The selection of mitigations applicable to each of the threats can serve as inputs
into mitigation optimization approaches thereby bridging the gap between cyber risk
assessment and final mitigation selection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss related
literature in three domains: cyber risk assessment, mitigation optimization analysis, and
document-driven decision supports systems. In Chapter 3, we discuss our research
methodology, which is grounded in the principles of the Design Science Research Methodology
(DSRM) (Hevner & March, 2004; Peffers et al., 2007), seeking tangible IS solutions to “wicked
problems” (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). Per the DSRM, we identify objectives of a solution
to our stated research problem, then we discuss the design and development of the solution
artifact drawing from the knowledge base of applicable theory. We also discuss our approach
to demonstrating the use of the artifact to solve a real-life problem and the evaluation criteria
used to measure the success of the artifact. In Chapter 4, we discuss our results and assess the
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validity of our research. Finally, in Chapter 5 we discuss conclusions and limitations of the
present research and propose future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
A solution to the problem of automatically selecting mitigations pertinent to a given
threat lies at the nexus of threat-informed cyber risk assessment methodologies and mitigation
optimization analysis. We investigate literature in these two domains to ensure that our solution
broadly supports existing methodologies. We also survey existing threat taxonomies and
control catalogs to further delineate the gap. Despite an extensive search of the literature, we
did not find any published research dealing specifically with automated matching of mitigations
to cyber threats; hence, the DSS section of this literature review considers research that we
consider analogous to our research problem.

Cyber Risk Assessment Methodologies
A number of threat-informed cyber risk assessment methodologies are described in the
literature and in use today. They include AURUM (Fenz, Ekelhart, & Neubauer, 2011), BluGen
(Llanso, McNeil, Pearson, & Moore, 2017), Crown Jewels Analysis and Threat Assessment
and Remediation Analysis (CJA+TARA) (MITRE, 2015), Mission Information Risk Analysis
(MIRA) (Llanso, Hamilton, & Silberglitt, 2012; Llanso, Tally, Silberglitt, & Anderson, 2013),
NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), Operationally Critical
Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Caralli, Stevens, Young, & Wilson,
2007), and Risk IT (ISACA, 2009; Schmittling, 2010). These methods are representative of
approaches in use by organizations that employ structured threat-informed cyber risk
assessment and their descriptions are available in open literature. This is not an exhaustive
survey, and in particular does not include proprietary and other closed-source methodologies.
The approaches mentioned here, which are described in more detail in Appendix E, have several
themes in common, including an enumeration of the critical IT assets and data, consideration
of threats (e.g. in terms of vulnerabilities, adverse events, or adversary capabilities), expert
scoring (e.g. estimated likelihood of event occurrence, level of adversary effort to cause the
effect, consequence/mission event impact), and methods which combine the scores in order to
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identify high priority threats. For purposes of the research gap we seek to fill, the key take-away
about threat-informed cyber risk assessment is this: most existing cyber risk assessment
methods stop short of recommending mitigations.

Mitigation Optimization Analysis
A number of authors have tackled the problem of mitigation optimization analysis; that
is, taking a longer list of possible mitigations and prioritizing or down-selecting to a shorter list
based on a set of defined objectives. These methods are summarized below and described in
more detail in Appendix F.
Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM), also known as multiple-criteria decision
analysis (MCDA), is widely applied to security portfolio2 selection (Barnard & von Solms,
2000; Fenz et al., 2011; Patterson, Nutaro, Allgood, Kuruganti, & Fugate, 2013; Sawik, 2013;
Schilling & Werners, 2016; Weishäupl, 2017; Yevseyeva, Basto-Fernandes, Emmerich, & Van
Moorsel, 2015). MCDM is used to analyze problems where measures of costs and benefits exist
and can be traded off to arrive at the best solution under the given constraints. Some MCDM
techniques applied to mitigation optimization include or are based on fuzzy set theory (Otero,
2014), multi-attribute utility theory (i.e. value functions, knapsack strategy) (Fielder, Panaousis,
Malacaria, Hankin, & Smeraldi, 2016; Panaousis, Fielder, Malacaria, Hankin, & Smeraldi,
2014; Shapasand, Shajari, Golpaygani, & Ghavamipoor, 2015; Smeraldi & Malacaria, 2014),
evolutionary multi-objective optimization (EMO) also known as genetic algorithms (Gupta,
Rees, Chaturvedi, & Chi, 2006; Kiesling, Ekelhart, Grill, Strauss, & Stummer, 2016; Kiesling,
Strauß, & Stummer, 2012; Rees, Deane, Rakes, & Baker, 2011; Sarala, Zayaraz, &
Vijayalakshmi, 2016; Viduto, Maple, Huang, & López-Peréz, 2012), analytic hierarchy process
(AHP) (El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010), grey relational analysis (GRA) (Breier & Hudec, 2013),
simple additive weighting (SAW) (Llanso, 2012; Llansó, McNeil, & Noteboom, 2019), the
technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) (Breier & Hudec, 2013),
and preference ranking organization method for enrichment evaluation (PROMETHEE) (Lv,
Zhou, & Wang, 2011). In addition, several authors combine game theory with MCDM
techniques for security portfolio selection (Fielder et al., 2016; Panaousis et al., 2014; Wang &

2

An organization’s chosen list of mitigations is often referred to as a security portfolio.
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Zhu, 2016). For purposes of the research gap we seek to fill the key take-away about mitigation
optimization analyses is this: These approaches all assume that a starting set of possible
mitigations exists on which to apply the prioritization/selection method; however, as we noted
above, cyber risk assessment methods stop short of providing this data. A method to produce
this initial mapping of potential mitigations to threats is the gap the current research seeks to
fill.

Threat Taxonomies and Control Catalogs
A number of control catalogs exist in practice today, such as the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS) (PCI Security Standards Council, 2015), HIPPA Security
Standards (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007), and NIST Security and Privacy
Controls for Federal Systems (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012). These
catalogs are intended to prescribe controls for compliance with security mandates, however,
they do not map the controls to the specific threats they counter. Likewise, a number of threat
frameworks exist in practice, including the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (MITRE, 2017a), Carnegie-Mellon taxonomy of operational cyber security risks
(Cebula, Popeck, & Young, 2014), National Intelligence Cyber Threat Framework (National
Security Agency, 2018), Open Threat Taxonomy (Enclave Security, 2015), and others
(European Union Agency For Network And Information Security, 2016; Launius, 2018;
Simmons, Shiva, Bedi, & Dasgupta, 2014). Of these, the CAPEC and Carnegie-Mellon
frameworks contain representative mappings of threats to mitigations, but there is currently no
published comprehensive source of threat-mitigation mappings.

Document-Driven Decision Support Systems
Casting our research problem as an information retrieval (IR) problem gives rise to three
veins of DSS research for investigation: (1) using classification to judge whether each item in
the mitigation corpus should be included in or excluded from a particular threat’s mitigation
set, (2) using a retrieval/ranking model such as commonly used in search engines to enumerate
mitigations ranked according to their likelihood of relevance to the threat, and (3) some
combination of the two. Lacking existing research dealing specifically with automated
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matching of mitigations to cyber threats, our discussion here considers supportive analogous
research.
Classification. Classification is a supervised machine learning technique in which a
new item is assigned to its appropriate category by a classifier, an algorithm or model which
has been trained to make such decisions after learning from training data consisting of items
whose categories are already known. Classification-based document selection has been
researched extensively in the context of the medical systematic reviews (SRs) underpinning
evidence-based medicine. A number of studies have demonstrated the viability of using
supervised machine learning classification to reduce manual workload in the abstract triage
process for updating existing SRs (Aphinyanaphongs & Aliferis, 2003; Bañez et al., 2016;
Bekhuis & Demner-Fushman, 2012; Bekhuis, Tseytlin, Mitchell, & Demner-Fushman, 2014;
Cohen, Hersh, Peterson, & Yen, 2006; Frunza, Inkpen, & Matwin, 2010; García Adeva, Pikatza
Atxa, Ubeda Carrillo, & Ansuategi Zengotitabengoa, 2014; Howard et al., 2016; Liu, Timsina,
& El-Gayar, 2016; Matwin, Kouznetsov, Inkpen, Frunza, & O’Blenis, 2010; Mo, Kontonatsios,
& Ananiadou, 2015; Shemilt et al., 2014; Timsina, Liu, & El-Gayar, 2016). Updating SRs has
historically entailed a labor-intensive, time-consuming, multi-step process in which subject
matter experts attempt to identify and down-select from the massive corpus of medical research
all research pertinent to a particular medical question so that the research can be synthesized to
answer the question. During the initial stage in the selection process, known as broad screening
or abstract triage, human experts must review and make relevant/not-relevant judgments on
many thousands of abstracts returned by an initial keyword search. The goal of the triage stage
is to exclude those abstracts that are obviously irrelevant, but include the rest for further
consideration in the second stage. The triage stage demands high recall3 (>95% (Cohen et al.,
2006)) to ensure all relevant research is considered, but is less stringent about precision,
tolerating a few false positives. This reflects the customs of the problem domain: It is
unacceptable to overlook research relevant to the problem for this could impact the overall
quality of the SR. On the other hand, it is tolerable to include some potentially irrelevant
documents because these will be screened out by human reviewers in the next stage of the

3

Recall is the ratio of relevant records retrieved to the total relevant records in the corpus. Precision is the ratio
of relevant records retrieved to total records retrieved (Singhal, 2001).
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process (Matwin et al., 2010). Comprehensiveness and currency of SRs is confounded by the
large, continually-evolving, and highly technical nature of medical literature. In addition, SRs
typically operate on a large corpus of candidate studies where only a small percentage (e.g.
<15%) will ultimately be true positives selected for inclusion in the synthesis (Kontonatsios et
al., 2017; Shemilt et al., 2014), a condition known as imbalance.
The document selection process for SRs bears stark similarities to our research problem
in which we have a large corpus of continually-evolving, highly technical cybersecurity
literature and we want to present mitigation documents for a given threat while omitting those
that are extraneous. Moreover, like SRs, threat-mitigation matching operates on an imbalanced
corpus of candidate mitigations where only a small percentage are relevant to any particular
threat. A key similarity between selecting literature for a SR and selecting mitigations for a
threat may be the value judgment that high recall is more important than high precision. We
elect to favor recall in the precision-recall tradeoff for the same reason this choice was made in
the case of medical SRs and we assume that a few false positives can be manually screened out,
if necessary.
Ranked Retrieval. Commonly used in search engines, ranked retrieval considers
relevance between a query and a document, not as a binary concept, but as a matter of degree.
A retrieval model assigns a relevance score to each query-document pair via a ranking function.
When ordered in descending sequence by the relevance score, those documents at the top of the
list are the documents deemed to be most relevant to the query. Unfortunately, for purposes of
making binary relevant/non-relevant decisions using ranked results, one must determine a cutoff point in the ordered list. This is a challenging problem because, in general, the number of
relevant results expected is not known a-priori (Manning, Raghavan, & Schutze, 2009).
Similarity-based text retrieval models judge the relevance of document to a query in a
manner that does not require all the words in the query to be present in the document. The
Vector Space Model is a well-known document representation scheme in text retrieval. Each
document is represented as a vector of the document words or terms where each word has a
weight indicating its overall importance in the document. Some common weighting schemes
are binary (term presence or absence), term frequency (TF, the number of times the term appears
in the document), and term frequency/inverse document frequency (TFIDF), a technique that
counterbalances the term frequency with a factor accounting for the total number of documents
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that contain the term. When aggregated, the document vectors form a term-document matrix
that can be manipulated using matrix mathematics. The Vector Space Model represents the
corpus of document vectors in a common vector space in which the similarity between two
documents or between a document and a query can be calculated via a distance measure known
as cosine similarity (Manning et al., 2009; Turtle & Croft, 1992). The result of testing the
similarity of a query to a corpus of documents will be a ranked ordering of the documents from
most to least similar based on the individual words in the documents.
Latent semantic analysis (LSA) (also called latent semantic indexing (LSI) in some
contexts) is another similarity-based retrieval model. It a statistical technique that attempts to
address language complexity, such as synonymy, by considering the term-document
relationships as a statistical distribution representing an “underlying latent structure” of the
document corpus (Deerwester, Dumais, Furnas, Landauer, & Harshman, 1990). In LSA, the
term-document matrix is transformed via singular-value decomposition (SVD) resulting in a
semantic space representing the “major associative patterns” (Deerwester et al., 1990) in the
corpus. This semantic space contains the “best K orthogonal factors” (Foltz, 1990) which
approximate the original document matrix and, importantly, the most closely associated terms
and documents are clustered near one another such that terms that did not appear in a given
document (e.g. synonyms) may still be located near the document due to overall word
association patterns. Deerwester et al. observed substantial improvement for LSA-based text
retrieval over keyword-based retrieval. They also noted as a practical matter that the
transformed matrix is substantially smaller than the original term-document matrix, requiring
only 50-150 factors compared with the hundreds or thousands of words typical of a large
document corpus.
Several studies analogous to our present research utilized similarity-based ranked
retrieval to perform technical document matching, two based on keywords and one based on
LSA. Swanson et al. (Swanson & Smalheiser, 1997) developed an automated method based on
keyword searching for linking complementary sets of articles in the MEDLINE database. In
another study, Goldrich et al. (Goldrich et al., 2014) applied search engine technology,
including Apache Lucene (Apache Foundation, 2018), keyword matching, key phrases, query
expansion with synonyms, and the WordNet lexical database (Miller, 1995; Princeton
University, 2017) to match cybersecurity requirements stated as text to descriptions of research
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projects in order to point out research aligned with the requirements. Finally, Foltz (Foltz, 1990)
applied LSA to find new relevant documents in a corpus based on an existing profile of
documents that had been previously deemed relevant. Foltz first constructed a semantic space
of articles a priori deemed relevant. To determine if a new document was relevant, it was first
transformed to the semantic space of relevant articles. Then, if its nearest neighbor was another
relevant document or if it was neighbors with more relevant articles than non-relevant articles
it was relevant. Using the nearest neighbor approach and averaging the precision at 3 levels of
recall (.25, .5, and .75), Foltz’s LSA-based method demonstrated between 13% and 25%
improvement in retrieval results on three data sets over keyword matching based on 190-240
dimensions.
Hybrid Approaches. A few authors have explored the combined use of classification
and ranked retrieval techniques in text mining. For example, Manning et al. (Manning et al.,
2009) discussed an approach for machine-learned relevance scoring where each training data
instance consists of query terms (q), a document (d) reference, a binary judgment of the
relevance of d to q, the cosine similarity (s) of d and q and the query term proximity between d
and q. Nakamoto (Nakamoto, 2011) discussed a concept similar to Manning et al., except using
Okapi BM25 (Robertson, Walker, Jones, Hancock-Beaulieu, & Gatford, 1994) and PageRank
scores as features (instead of relevance and cosine similarity) and returning a relevance ranking
instead of a binary decision. Wiener et al. (Wiener, Pedersen, & Weigend, 1995) utilized LSI
for feature reduction instead of term selection (picking a representative subset of the original
terms) to identify topics using a neural network classifier in a corpus consisting of more than
11,000 unique terms. Gee (Gee, 2003) described a method for classifying email as spam or notspam using an “LSI-inspired” ensemble classifier implemented in three stages, where the stages
are similar to Foltz (Foltz, 1990). Gee’s method achieved very high (>0.98) precision and recall
on both the spam and not-spam classes when tested using just the nearest neighbor classification
strategy, just the majority strategy, and the two strategies in ensemble with the tie-breaker logic.
IR Evaluation. The ability to evaluate the effectiveness of a machine learning approach
is crucial to ensuring that the results are useful and not just a manifestation of chance. As we
have cast our research as an information retrieval problem, we now consider IR evaluation
methods. The documents in the corpus will fall into one of four categories at the conclusion of
a particular query: retrieved and relevant or true positive (TP), retrieved but not relevant or false
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positive (FP), not retrieved but relevant or false negative (FN), and not retrieved/not relevant
or true negative (TN). Accuracy, precision, and recall are the most common measures of
effectiveness in IR. They are all proportions with values between 0 and 1 inclusive based on
the above categorization of retrieval results (Manning et al., 2009). Powers points out a bias in
that these common measures tend to understate a method’s ability to correctly identify nonrelevant instances (Powers, 2007). The ability to rule out non-relevant instances can be a useful
measure of workload reduction.
Accuracy is the proportion of correctly classified items (TP + TN) to all items (TP + TN
+ FP + FN). It is generally a poor measure of IR effectiveness because it does not distinguish
success between the relevant (R) and non-relevant (NR) document classes. In particular,
accuracy is heavily swayed in cases where the data is imbalanced, which is almost always the
situation in IR. For example, a method that arbitrarily classifies all documents as NR would
appear highly accurate in a corpus with 90% NR documents (Manning et al., 2009) even though
it would incorrectly classify all the R documents.
Precision is the proportion of retrieved and relevant items (TP) to all retrieved items
(TP + FP) also called confidence in some fields. Recall is the proportion of retrieved and
relevant items (TP) to all relevant items (TP + FN) also called true positive rate or sensitivity.
There is an inverse relationship between precision and recall such that when one goes up the
other goes down. The weighted harmonic mean of precision and recall (F-measure) is a measure
used to trade-off precision and recall. The balanced F measure weights precision and recall
equally but weights can be set to emphasize one over the other if desired. The area under a
precision-recall curve (AUC) and the balanced F-measure are often used as measures of IR
effectiveness when balanced performance is sought (Manning et al., 2009; Powers, 2007;
Raghavan, Jung, & Bollman, 1989).
Because an IR query commonly results in a ranked list of retrieved results, the expected
number of which is not known in advance, computation of a single overall precision and
especially recall can be challenging. In IR precision/recall data points can instead be considered
at each new relevant document in the ranked list. This gives rise to measures such as R-precision
or precision at a selected recall value (P@R or P(R), e.g. P(R=0.9)), and precision at rank (P@K
or P(K)), which is the precision calculated assuming a cut-off at a fixed location in the ranked
list. In user-facing search applications, it is widely accepted that the user generally only looks
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at the first page of search results; hence, P@K is often used to measure search effectiveness in
user-facing search applications. Because of the arbitrary fixed cut-off, P@K does not take into
account the variability in number of relevant results and thus it can be skewed when the actual
number of relevant entries is much greater or less than the fixed cut-off. R-precision
compensates for this weakness of P@K, essentially by computing P@K where K is the number
of relevant entries that must be returned to achieve the desired recall (Manning et al., 2009;
Raghavan et al., 1989).
Sensitivity and specificity are measures used in fields such medicine and behavioral
science to judge the effectiveness of diagnostic tests. Sensitivity (or equivalently, true positive
rate, recall, probability of detection) is the proportion of true positives to all positive instances
or the extent to which actual positive instances are not ignored. In contexts where the objective
is to correctly identify all positives, such as medicine, recall is a primary evaluation metric
(Powers, 2007). Specificity (true negative rate) is the proportion of true negatives to all negative
instances or the extent to which actual negative instances are classified as such (Altman &
Bland, 1994). In contexts where the objective is to rule out large swaths of negative instances,
such as SRs, specificity can be an effective evaluation measure. The fallout (or false positive
rate) is the proportion of false positives to all negative instances, i.e. the probability that a nonrelevant document will be retrieved.
The best evaluation measures can only be chosen by considering the requirements of
the particular IR scenario. We discuss the evaluation methods we have chosen for our research
in Chapter 3. In some applications, recall may be more important than precision (e.g. medical
SRs and threat-mitigation matching) or vice versa. Recall should be emphasized when it is
essential not to miss any relevant documents and some false positives can be tolerated. On the
other hand, precision should be emphasized when a subset of documents is sufficient to answer
the request (Manning et al., 2009). Finally, according to Raghavan et al. the “usefulness of a
retrieval system is determined to a great extent by how closely it can characterize the
dichotomy” of relevant vs non-relevant documents for its intended purpose (Raghavan et al.,
1989).
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Summary
In the Literature Review we discussed threat-informed cyber risk assessment and
mitigation selection optimization approaches to delineate the boundaries of the gap that our
research addresses. Casting the research problem as an information retrieval problem, we
identified pertinent research upon which to build. This includes a robust body of work applying
classification techniques to medical systematic reviews, a modest body of work applying
similarity-based techniques to technical document matching, and examples of combining the
two. Finally, we explored the literature supporting evaluation methods in DSS and IR. In
subsequent chapters we will refer back to this existing theory as a basis for our research.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Design Science Research
We selected the Design Science Research Model (DSRM) (Hevner & March, 2004;
Peffers et al., 2007) as the research framework within which to organize our research. DSRM
attempts to solve so-called “wicked problems” through the development and evaluation of IT
artifacts (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004).

Figure 2. DSRM Model from (Peffers et al., 2007)
Peffers et al. describe an iterative process with six stages as illustrated in Figure 2. In
Table 1, we enumerate the DSRM stages and demonstrate the alignment of our research to
them. The DSRM is appropriate for this research because we want to create an IT artifact to
solve a challenging problem for which a solution will contribute to theory and practice.
Table 1. DSRM Stages and Alignment
Stage
1

Alignment
Identify and

In Chapter 1 we identified and motivated the threat-

motivate the

mitigation matching problem and discussed our proposed

problem

contributions. These are crucial steps in the DSRM because

18
Stage

Alignment
they establish problem relevance, where relevance is judged
in the context of a “heretofore unsolved and important”
problem for a “constituent community” of IS practitioners
(Hevner & March, 2004).

2

Define objectives of

In Chapter 3 (this chapter) we define the objectives of a

a solution

solution to our research problem. The objectives provide a
preview of the desired end state and set the stage for artifact
evaluation.

3

Design and develop

In Chapter 2, we discussed pertinent literature. The DSRM

the artifact

requires that we draw upon existing research as the basis for

iteratively and based

the artifact; the Literature Review paved the way for doing

on existing theory

so. Later in Chapter 3 (this chapter) we discuss our iterative
approach to design and development, synthesizing from the
cyber and DSS domains.

4

Demonstrate the

In Chapter 4, we describe the artifact (method) and discuss

artifact by using it to

the results of applying instantiations of the method to solve

solve an instance of

five test instances of the problem.

the problem
5

Evaluate how well

In Chapter 4, we evaluate the effectiveness of the artifact

the artifact solves

using evaluation measures drawn from the literature. In

the problem; iterate

Chapter 5, we summarize our contributions and propose

back to design

future work. These discussions set the stage for future
iterations of design in the spirit of the DSRM.

6

Communicate results This dissertation and the associated defense presentation
to scholarly and

satisfy the DSRM requirement for communication. We

practitioner

designed the artifact using rigorous, practitioner-accepted

communities

modeling techniques to facilitate communication to both
scholarly and practitioner communities.
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Objectives of a Solution
Defining the objectives of a solution to the research problem at hand is an important
predecessor to artifact design because it previews the desired end state. Objectives also provide
the foundation on which to build an evaluation strategy. A solution to our research problem
described above will:
•

Process existing English language text documents where each separately describes
either a threat or a mitigation (e.g. threat models, practice manuals, control catalogs,
vendor product white papers)

•

Provide an automated method for recommending (matching) relevant mitigations when
presented with a threat

•

Match a high percentage of relevant mitigations for a given threat while avoiding
selection of non-relevant mitigations

•

Accommodate (be extensible to) new and evolving threats and mitigations,

•

Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in mitigation selection, and

•

Be able to be used in a system that allows for reuse of the artifact and the matches
produced by the artifact.

Theoretical Background
The DSRM emphasizes design and evaluation rigor through building upon existing
research from the literature. Because knowledge about threats and mitigations is largely
expressed in unstructured or semi-structured text documents, our idea is to cast the threatmitigation problem as an information retrieval problem, using the threat as a query and the
mitigation documents as the corpus to be searched, and then build on applicable DSS research.
Applying techniques described in the literature we considered artifact designs from three
categories for the threat-mitigation matcher:
1. Classification. Drawing from the medical SRs research, approaches based on
classifying mitigation documents as relevant or not relevant to a given threat
2. Ranked Retrieval. Drawing from (Swanson & Smalheiser, 1997), (Goldrich et al.,
2014), and Foltz (Foltz, 1990), approaches based on ranked retrieval, and

20
3. Hybrid. Drawing from (Manning et al., 2009), (Nakamoto, 2011), and (Gee, 2003),
hybrid approaches that combine techniques from ranked retrieval in conjunction with
classification.
In Chapter 4, we describe an iterative process wherein we experiment with several
artifact instantiations in each design category. We discuss the results of these trials, which
instantiations we decided to advance, which we left behind, and why, with evaluation criteria
drawn from the theoretical bases discussed in the Evaluation section of the Literature Review.

Design and Development of the Artifact
The nature of design is best described as a cycle consisting of brainstorming ideas and
testing them against the solution objectives (Simon, 1997), continuously refining ideas until the
desired end state is reached. Prototyping, solution validation, and feedback are emphasized,
aligning with the iterative nature of Design Science Research and, importantly, helps
distinguish Design Science Research from routine professional design (Hevner & Chatterjee,
2010). In Chapter 4, we discuss highlights of the iterative design process we followed during
development of our artifact.
The DSRM requires that artifact be constructed and evaluated with rigor (Hevner &
March, 2004). To promote design rigor, we have drawn from research and practice in the cyber
risk assessment, mitigation optimization analysis, and DSS domains, as discussed in the
preceding Literature Review. Moreover, we represented design using the unified modeling
language (UML) (Booch, Rumbaugh, & Jacobson, 2000) and entity-relationship drawings
(ERD) (Chen, 1976). These are rigorous methods for modeling software that are commonly
accepted and understood in the IS practitioner community. In addition, we designed the artifact
using object-oriented software practices intended to increase modularity, improve quality, and
make designs and software more resilient to evolution. The artifact produced by this research
is described in Chapter 4. An architecture for the practical use of the artifact is described in
Appendix C. We touch on evaluation rigor briefly here and more fully in Chapter 4.
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Demonstration and Evaluation Plan
In the DSRM, demonstration and evaluation work together to show that the artifact
effectively solves the problem. Hevner and March state a number of evaluation methods that
top the rigor threshold, classifying them into the following categories: observational (e.g. case
or field study), analytical (e.g. quantitative comparisons, such as of time or cost), experiment
or simulation, testing, and descriptive (e.g. argument or scenarios) (Hevner & March, 2004). In
the present research, we demonstrate instantiations of the artifact by applying them to a corpus
based on the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) dataset version
2.11 (MITRE, 2017a). Table 2 summarizes our evaluation plan, including artifact evaluation
criteria aligned with the solution objectives. To ensure evaluation rigor, the evaluation methods
are drawn from among those given by Hevner and specific performance measures are drawn
from the DSS and IR domains. Note that the most important objective is the third one as the
others are only germane after the artifact achieves satisfactory matching performance. Utility is
also important as we wish to solve a practical problem. The results of artifact evaluation are
discussed in Chapter 4.
Table 2. Solution Objectives with Evaluation Methods and Criteria
Objective

Evaluation Criteria

Process existing English language text

Testing: Demonstrate that the instantiated

documents where each separately

artifact accepts English language text

describes either a threat or a mitigation.

documents about threats and mitigations.

Provide an automated method for

Testing: Demonstrate that the instantiated

recommending (matching) relevant

artifact will propose matching mitigations

mitigations when presented with a threat.

when a threat is given.

Match all or nearly all of the relevant

Analytical: Achieve acceptable performance

mitigations for a given threat while

measures on test data. We emphasize high

avoiding selection of non-relevant

recall to retrieve nearly all relevant

mitigations.

mitigations. We emphasize moderate to high
precision and low false positives to avoid
selecting non-relevant mitigations.
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Objective

Evaluation Criteria

Accommodate (be extensible to) new and

Descriptive: Describe how the artifact is

evolving threats and mitigations.

extensible for future threats and mitigations
Analytical: Achieve acceptable performance
measures on test data.

Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in

Descriptive: Integrate results of performance,

mitigation selection.

extensibility, and reuse evaluations to make a
logical argument about utility. We emphasize
high sensitivity to rule out most non-relevant
mitigations leading to reduced workload for
the CSE.

Be able to be used in a system that allows

Descriptive: Describe how the artifact is

for reuse of the artifact and the matches

reusable and how the knowledge produced by

produced by the artifact.

the artifact is reusable.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Data Source Description
We used version 2.11 of the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) dataset (MITRE, 2017a) as the data source for this research. The CAPEC dataset is
available for download and can also be browsed online (MITRE, 2017b). CAPEC is an existing
corpus of attach patterns (i.e. threats) expressed in English language documents packaged in an
XML structure. Although mitigation mapping is not the focus of CAPEC, some attack patterns
include illustrative mitigations. CAPEC contains a hierarchical representation of attack
patterns, where the highest level consists of meta attack patterns. These are architecture/designfocused and not based on specific technologies or implementations. Each meta pattern
decomposes into several standard attack patterns, which are more detailed and include
information about the goal of and technique used in the attack. Each standard pattern
decomposes into detailed patterns, which are the most granular. For our purpose, we focus on
the standard patterns, which strike a good middle ground between the meta and detailed patterns
and are most representative of the level of specificity for threats in the cyber risk assessment
domain. There are 127 standard threats in CAPEC. There are approximately 600 mitigation
texts in the corpus. The number of mitigations mapped to each standard threat varies from 0 to
about 10. These mappings are intended to be representative and not comprehensive as threatmitigation mapping is not the intent of CAPEC.
CAPEC has existed in the cybersecurity community since 2007. We consider the
CAPEC threat-mitigation mappings to be ground truth and we recognize that the quality of the
data is key to our results. While we do not have objective evidence of the quality of the CAPEC
threats, mitigations, and mappings, we accept CAPEC’s heritage as an indicator of sufficient
quality for this proof of concept research. By personal inspection, we searched CAPEC for
threats which had at least a paragraph of descriptive text and about 10 relevant mitigations for
use as labeled data. We were able to find five threats and associated mitigations which are
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suitable test cases for our purpose. We also found some weaknesses in this data source, which
we discuss below.
We used XML parsing to decompose CAPEC into its component threat documents,
mitigation documents, and mappings between the two. During parsing, we preserved selected
information from the document structure (e.g. title, description, threat category) per related
work (Cohen, 2008; Matwin et al., 2010; Mo et al., 2015; Small, Wallace, Brodley, &
Trikalinos, 2011) which suggests that certain parts of the document may yield impactful
features for classification. The following data was extracted from CAPEC for threat documents:
•

ID #

•

Title (free text)

•

Description (free text)

•

Abstraction level (meta, standard, detailed)

•

Domain of attack

•

Mechanism of attack

•

Parent attack pattern

•

Immediate children attack patterns

The following data was extracted from CAPEC for mitigation documents:
•

ID #

•

Title (constructed by taking first 75 characters of the description)

•

Description (free text)

The following data was extracted from CAPEC for existing threat-mitigation mappings.
A subset of these mappings was used as labeled data for training models and the rest was used
for testing.
•

Threat ID #

•

Mitigation ID #

•

Relevant/not relevant indicator
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Strengths of the CAPEC data for our purpose include detailed threat descriptions,
metadata including categorical and hierarchical relationships, open4 accessibility, and available
threat-mitigation mappings. The CAPEC data has several key weaknesses when considered for
our application. We highlight those weaknesses and the work-arounds we implemented here.
First, the threat documents are more robust in length and content than the mitigation documents.
Since we want to treat the threat as a query, the opposite situation would have been better.
Second, the data is imbalanced; that is, there are a relatively small number of relevant mitigation
instances per threat compared to non-relevant instances. We lessened this weakness by drawing
in some additional mitigations from other sources. Third, and perhaps most concerning, the
quality and style of the prose within the threat and mitigation documents varies significantly
from one document to the next. For document-driven DSS methods to produce good threatmitigation matches, the threats and mitigations must both be well-described. We addressed this
weakness by selecting a handful of the best quality threat documents from CAPEC to use as
our demonstration cases. Fourth, we found a few situations where, due to human error, the
mappings were erroneous. Since we rely on the mappings as ground truth, we corrected the
errors manually. Finally, we had initially hoped to utilize the Domain of Attack and/or
Mechanism of Attack metadata in CAPEC as features to support classification in a manner
similar to the way the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) (Lowe & Barnett, 1994) support
classification for medical SRs (Timsina et al., 2016). Unfortunately, the existence of this
metadata within the CAPEC proved to be insufficient for our purpose, so we had to abandon
this idea.
Although the CAPEC weaknesses represent minor inconveniences, they do not
invalidate our research because our research is not specifically about the CAPEC data; it is
more generally about the concept of threat-mitigation document matching. CAPEC is simply a
vehicle, a convenient source of labeled data (the only non-proprietary source we could find).
Finally, we note that none of the above criticism is meant to detract from the value of the
CAPEC data for its original intended purpose. We acknowledge their efforts to produce it and
thank them for making their work openly available for use.

4

“The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use Common
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC™) for research, development, and commercial purposes.
Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE’s copyright designation
and this license in any such copy.” (MITRE, 2017a)
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Iterative Design
In this section, we discuss highlights of the iterative design and experimentation that led
to our artifact and instantiations. At the outset, we had three design concepts for the threatmitigation matcher: classification, ranked retrieval, and a hybrid of the two. We explored a
number of designs, including various classifiers, feature sets, and feature reduction techniques.
Details of the design iterations are contained in Appendix D and summarized in the next few
sections.
We used precision, recall, and the rate of false positives to judge the merits of each
design. We chose these measures because they are among the ones most commonly used to
compare text classifiers and retrieval models. In mitigation selection, omitting a relevant
mitigation (recall error or false negative) means a useful mitigation could be overlooked. On
the other hand, including a non-relevant mitigation (precision error or false positive) means the
CSE may be presented with a mitigation that does not actually protect against the threat. While
both are undesirable situations, we emphasize recall (i.e. to present all relevant mitigations) in
our artifact with the assumption that a few false positives are tolerable and we can rely on the
CSE to reject them during the screening phase (similar to the process for medical SRs).

Tool Choices
For some of the classification designs, we used the Waikato Environment for
Knowledge Analysis (Weka) data mining toolkit presented by the University of Waikato
(Kaluža, 2013). We selected this toolkit because it is well-known in data mining, remains under
active development and use, has a robust user interface for experimentation, and also has a Java
application programming interface (API) which we found attractive for practical purposes. In
particular, we used the Weka SMO classifier, which implements the sequential minimal
optimization algorithm for training a support vector classifier as described in (Platt, 1998). We
also utilized scikit-learn, a Python machine learning environment (Pedregosa, Weiss, &
Brucher, 2011) developed under the auspices of INRIA (“About us,” 2019) for some
classification trials. We selected this toolkit because it is well-known in data mining, remains
under active development and use, is well-documented, has a robust API, and supports some
additional evaluation methods beyond what we could obtain from Weka. In scikit-learn we used
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C-support vector classification (SVC). Both Weka SMO and scikit-learn SVC are based on
LIBSVM (Chang & Lin, 2018), the most common SVM library.
For the keyword/phrase-based designs, we used the keyword/phrase extraction library
implemented by Paco Nathan (Nathan, 2010). It is based on the TextRank algorithm described
in (Mihalcea & Tarau, 2004).
For some of the ranked retrieval designs, we used the Apache Lucene (Apache
Foundation, 2013) implementation of the Vector Space Model. We selected Apache Lucene
because it is well-known, actively developed, well-documented, and has a robust Java API. For
other ranked retrieval trials, we used the Gensim topic modeling toolkit presented by Radim
Rehurek (Rehurek, 2018). We selected Gensim primarily for its LSA implementation. It is wellknown, actively developed, and well-documented. It is implemented in Python and has a robust
API that facilitates integration into an overall architecture.

“One for All” Designs
We initially wondered if there was a way to implement a “one for all” approach where
a single matcher would determine relevant mitigations for any threat contained in the corpus.
We explored this concept in two hybrid designs, a SVM classifier based on LSA features and a
three-stage voting classifier also based on LSA (Gee, 2003). These are discussed in more detail
in Appendix D. Neither of the “one for all” designs produced results better than random
guessing. Intuition suggests that the relationship between one threat and its relevant mitigations
may be different from the next threat/mitigations, such that combining many such relationships
in a single semantic space may dilute the relationships. Thus, we abandoned the “one for all”
avenue of investigation and proceeded on the “per threat” route.

“Per Threats” Designs
Following the medical SR literature discussed in the Literature Review, we started with
a single threat and some labeled mitigation data that contained instances relevant and not
relevant to the threat. We had an intuition that the best approach for one threat would also work
for other threats. In order for the “per threat” approach to solve the problem at hand, we would
have to eventually train a classifier for each existing threat and likewise for new threats that
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come along; however, this does not seem like an unreasonable requirement. First, while new
threats do come along, the set of known threats is relatively stable over time. In the ten months
since we started this research, the CAPEC dataset has undergone two subsequent releases but
only two new standard threats have been added to CAPEC in that time. Second, building the
classifiers can eventually be automated using the API provided by the machine learning toolkits.
By browsing threats using the online version of the CAPEC dataset (MITRE, 2017b),
we selected threat 49, password brute force guessing, as our first test case. We selected this
threat because it had robust descriptive text and at least 10 relevant mitigations in the labeled
data. Figure 3 shows a summary of the precision, recall, and false positive rates (crossvalidation statistics) for several “per threat” designs. The bracketed [C], [TR], and [H] in the
design names indicate the design concept: classification, text retrieval, or hybrid. For the
classification and hybrid approaches, we show the cross-validation statistics for both the R and
NR class. For the text retrieval designs, it is customary to evaluate based just on relevant results
retrieved.

Figure 3. Summary of “Per Threat” Iterations
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“Per Threat” Classification
We initially tested several classifiers before finally deciding to go forward with SVM.
SVM has been shown to perform favorably for text classification, especially when the number
of positive instances per category is small (Platt, 1998) and the feature set is large (Joachims,
1998). We discuss our selection of SVM further in the upcoming Artifact Design and Rationale
sections. We experimented with two classification strategies for the “per threat” approach, one
using the full text of the mitigations and the other using threat keywords/phrases.
Full text strategy. We investigated SVM classification of the full mitigation text. We
performed tokenization of the text, removed numbers and punctuation, converted the text to
lower case, stemmed, removed stop words, and retained the most frequent 1,000 words as
TFIDF features plus the R/NR label. The corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances, 9
of which were relevant. We evaluated models with and without an information gain filter for
feature reduction. As shown in Figure 3, the best of full text models had high precision (0.92),
no false positives, but unacceptably low recall (0.48) on the R class. On the NR class, precision
and recall were very high (>0.99) but with a 50% false positive rate. The model was very good
at correctly classifying non-relevant instances, partially due to the class imbalance in the data,
but it was not good at correctly classifying relevant instances, likely for the same reason. It
became apparent that it was necessary to do something about the class imbalance. In addition,
note that this approach does not utilize any information from the threat; thus, such an approach
may not generalize to other threats.
Keywords/phrases strategy. An inspection of the mitigation text for the relevant
examples revealed that those which were correctly classified in the full-text strategy have in
common some words from threat 49 suggesting keywords/phrases as a possible way to
introduce information from the threat text into the approach, while also potentially improving
the classification results. We used an implementation of TextRank (Nathan, 2010) to
automatically extract keywords/phrases from the threat text. Some of these keywords/phrases
were rather rough, so we decided to clean them up manually. Then we converted the
keywords/phrases to lower case and removed stop words. We made an intentional decision not
to stem the keywords/phrases, but in some cases we included important variances as keywords
in their own right. Next, we investigated techniques to address the class imbalance in the data
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(Cohen et al., 2006; Miwa, Thomas, O’Mara-Eves, & Ananiadou, 2014; Timsina et al., 2016).
The most obvious solution was to supplement the relevant mitigations, so we extracted about a
dozen additional documents relevant to threat 49 from the Internet and added them to the data.
We also performed two-thirds random undersampling of the dominant (NR) class to reduce the
NR instances and 100% Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) (He & Garcia,
2009; Liu et al., 2016) of the R class to increase the R instances. The SMOTE technique creates
new instances of the minority class by drawing features from the K (e.g., 5) nearest minority
neighbors based on Euclidean distance in the feature space. Undersampling can result in
information loss while oversampling can lead to overfitting; however, due to the extreme
imbalance, these were risks worth taking.
For this trial, the features consisted of threat 49 keyword/phrase counts. After balancing,
the corpus consisted of about 220 mitigation instances, 20 of which were relevant. We used
several different methods for determining the keyword/phrase counts, including a simple count
of the times a keyword/phrase appeared in the mitigation document (TF), TFIDF, TF divided
by the total number of words in the document, and 0 or 1 to indicate the keyword/phrase is
present or absent in the document. Of these, the presence/absence approach yielded the best
model. As shown in Figure 3, the best of the keyword/phrase models had high precision (0.97),
no false positives, and improved recall (0.74) on the R class. On the NR class, precision and
recall were very high (>0.99) but with a 24% false positive rate. Two important disadvantages
of this design are as follows: manual intervention is required to extract the threat
keywords/phrases and recall is still too low.
We were curious about the potential impact of additional under- and oversampling, so
we experimented with 3/4 undersampling of the NR class, and 200% oversampling of the R
class for threat 49. When comparing 3/4 undersampling versus 2/3 undersampling of the NR
class for the same oversampling percentage (100%) of the R class, the precision, recall, and Fmeasure for 2/3 undersampling was better. When we increased oversampling of the R class to
200%, recall of the R class seemed to improve overall but with a small toll on precision. In the
200% oversampling case, the model failed to properly classify test samples. These results
suggest that 3/4 NR undersampling was too much and, when combined with 200% R
oversampling, the model was becoming overfit to the training data.
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“Per Threat” Ranked Retrieval
As a possible alternative to classification, we investigated two ranked retrieval
approaches to matching relevant mitigations for a given threat similar to (Foltz, 1990; Goldrich
et al., 2014; Swanson & Smalheiser, 1997). First, we investigated ranking based on the Vector
Space Model as implemented in Apache Lucene. We also investigated ranking based on Latent
Semantic Analysis (Deerwester et al., 1990) as implemented in Gensim (Rehurek, 2018). The
corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances, 25 of which were relevant. As expected per
the Literature Review, LSA outperformed the Vector Space Model, retrieving 23 of 25 relevant
items versus 15 of 25. To calculate precision and recall, we cut the ranked list at 25 and used
the formulas discussed in the Literature Review. The main issue with this approach was lack of
a general strategy for implementing the R vs NR cut-off point in the ranked list. While the
number of R instances is known in the training data, it is unknown in the real world, making it
challenging to choose a generalized cut-off point.

“Per Threat” Hybrid
Drawing from (Manning et al., 2009), (Nakamoto, 2011), and (Gee, 2003), we
experimented with two hybrid approaches that combine ranked retrieval and classification. In
one approach we used features from an LSA transform of the mitigation text plus the R/NR
label in conjunction with the SVM classifier. This design was ultimately the one we selected
for our artifact. We discuss it in greater detail in the upcoming Artifact Design section.
In the other hybrid approach, we developed a method inspired by Gee (Gee, 2003) and
Foltz (Foltz, 1990) for classifying mitigations relevant/non-relevant to a given threat. First, we
used LSA to create a semantic space from a training set of labeled mitigation documents and
constructed an external index to maintain the known relevance status of each mitigation with
regard to the threat. Each new mitigation document, Mn, was used as a query against the
semantic space, returning a ranked list of other mitigation documents similar to Mn from most
similar to least. The classifier used the ranked list to classify Mn in three stages. First, it was
classified according to the class of its nearest neighbor in the space (i.e. the existing mitigation
document whose similarity score is highest). Next, Mn was classified according to class of the
majority of all results in the ranked list truncated at an arbitrary cut-off, C. Finally, if the
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majority and nearest neighbor stages agreed, Mn was deemed to be of the nearest neighbor’s
class. If the majority and nearest neighbor stages did not agree, the dispute was settled by the
third stage which attempts to detect the skew of Mn towards one class or the other. We
implemented the first 2 stages using an arbitrary cut-off of top 5, but for the tie-breaker we took
a simple default. This method yielded precision of 0.63 and recall of 0.83 with 3% false
positives on the R class and 0.99/0.97/17% for the NR class. Two ties were encountered in the
NR class indicating the need to consider better tie-breaker logic, but on further experimentation
we did not observe viable tie-breaking logic so we removed the design from further
consideration.
The best of the hybrid models was the design that combined SVM with LSA. This is the
design on which we ultimately based our artifact. It is discussed in detail in the Artifact Design
section. The corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances before balancing and 100
instances after balancing, 25 of which were relevant. For threat 49, the method yielded precision
of 0.95 and recall of 0.76 with 1% false positives on the R class and 0.93/0.99/24% for the NR
class. Recall was still too low, so we looked to the text to determine options for improvement.

Analysis of Text
Success in classifying textual data is heavily influenced by the characteristics of the text
itself. Having experimented with a few variations, it made sense to pause and look closely at
the text of threat 49 to gain insights on the matching successes and failures. In the training
corpus, there were 25 known relevant mitigations for threat 49. Using diagnostic tools, we
identified the mitigations commonly misclassified in the trials. We investigated these false
positives (FP) and false negatives (FN) to better understand how they differed from the correctly
classified instances. One thing the correctly classified instances had in common was that they
contained text explaining how the mitigation addresses the threat. The false negatives lacked
this explanatory text. The false positives fell into two categories: (a) some dealt with password
vulnerabilities but not specifically password brute force guessing and (b) others dealt with brute
force guessing but not of passwords. We hypothesized that improving the mitigation texts to
include an explanation of how each one addresses the threat would improve the match results
by reducing the FNs. Doing so also has practical benefits, allowing the CSE to better understand
the reason a mitigation is relevant to the threat, to determine its applicability in context, and to
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better convey the rationale to the decision-makers who fund mitigations. In some applications
of text mining (e.g. ratings, surveys, news articles), the text “is what it is” and we have to use
what we find. For threat-mitigation matching, it may be possible to influence the problem space;
thus, we do have the luxury of recommending improvements to the threat and mitigation
documents to better support automated matching in the future. With that in mind, we augmented
the text of the FNs from other sources and then reran selected trials. A comparison of the crossvalidation statistics for models trained on the unimproved and improved text is shown in Figure
5 and discussed below. In general, models trained with the improved text demonstrated better
precision and recall in cross-validation statistics than models trained on the unimproved text.
For threat 49 on the improved text, the method yielded precision of 0.96 and recall of 0.92 with
1% false positives on the R class and 0.97/0.99/8% for the NR class, leading us to select this
design as the selected approach for our artifact.

Artifact Design
Our artifact is designed to leverage SVM classification and LSA ranked retrieval. The
selected approach uses as features the R/NR label plus 200 features derived from an LSA
transform of the mitigation text. Using LSA affords a feature reduction from 1,500 unique
words in the plain text to 200 LSA topics. Model building is a three-step process, indexing,
balancing, and training, as illustrated in Figure 4. Note that a model is built for each threat; thus,
the mitigation documents input into the indexing stage are labeled as R/NR to the specific threat.
The corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances before balancing and 100 instances after
balancing, 25 of which were relevant.
In the indexing stage, for each mitigation text, stop words are removed, then the text is
tokenized, lower-cased, and stemmed. A TFIDF representation of the corpus is computed then
transformed using Gensim to an LSA semantic space or Latent Semantic Index retaining 200
topics. This is slightly higher than the number of standard threats in CAPEC and fits with
optimal LSI dimensionality findings in (Bradford, 2008). Bradford observed favorable results
when the number of topics was between 200 and 500 for a corpus with millions of documents.
We selected the low end of Bradford’s range because our corpus is much smaller. The LSA
semantic space and an index containing the labels are saved for use in similarity queries.
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During iterative design, we observed that the corpus was highly imbalanced in favor of
NR instances. In the balancing stage, we utilize LSA similarity scores as a means to balance
the training data. We query the mitigation LSA space using the full text of the threat document
(tokenized, stemmed, lower-cased, and transformed to the semantic space) as a query. Then,
we truncate the training data after the 100th ranked result, retaining the top 100 mitigation entries
based on similarity to the threat text. This balances the data that will be input into training by
reducing the number of NR instances. We intuit that this approach is better than simply
undersampling at random and over-sampling with SMOTE for the following reasons.
Undersampling at random could drop relevant entries of which we already have too few.
Oversampling with SMOTE adds new instances to the corpus, but no new knowledge. Because
the similarity score imparts some knowledge about the semantics of the entries, ingesting the
most similar entries during training will keep most of the relevant entries and in addition the
non-relevant entries that are most difficult to discriminate.

Figure 4. Artifact Design and Flow
In the training stage, we build an SVM classifier using scikit-learn for threat 49 (and
later for other threats), inputting the top 100 most similar mitigations from the balancing stage
for threat 49 and their labels into the learning process. The features consist of the LSA
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representation of each mitigation (200 features) plus the R/NR indicator. We save the models
for later use to predict the classes of new unlabeled mitigations.
We utilize the saved model in the predicting stage to classify new potential mitigations
as relevant or not relevant to the threat associated with the model. First, the text is transformed
to LSA features relative to the saved LSA space. Then the saved threat-specific classifier is
applied to label the LSA-transformed mitigations. Evaluation of the model based on new test
data is discussed in the upcoming Demonstration and Evaluation section.

Rationale for Selected Approach
In this section we discuss our rationale for the design of the selected method. We explain
why we explored LSA, classification, and a combination of the two, why we selected SVM,
and why we selected this approach as our method.
Why LSA? As we saw in the Literature Review section, Latent Semantic Analysis has
been shown to improve retrieval of relevant documents from a corpus when compared to
keyword search because LSA accounts for inherent complexities of natural language, including
synonymy, by evaluating the entire corpus for recurring word patterns. These word patterns are
used to construct a semantic space (a set of LSA topics) representing the corpus. Each document
in the corpus is represented according to its degree of similarity with the topics of the space. In
the literature, LSA is regarded as superior to keyword-based matching. In our experiments, we
observed that LSA improved the matching of mitigations to threats over keyword-based
matching, likely due to the cyber documents’ complex word patterns.
Why Classification? Supervised machine learning classification, is a statistical
approach for predicting the label or class of a new instance based on a model trained using
existing instances whose classes are known. The instances are represented by features
(independent variables) which are used to predict the label (dependent variable). The training
process analyzes the features and associated labels and detects relationships that allow the class
to be predicted for new instances represented according to the same features. Two-class
classification of text documents has been successfully demonstrated in the literature for
updating medical SRs as well as in our experiments for threat-mitigation matching. Moreover,
classification does not suffer from the ambiguous cut-off problem encountered in matching by
text retrieval.
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Why SVM? SVM has been shown to perform favorably for text classification,
especially when the number of positive instances per category is small (Platt, 1998). According
to Joachims (Joachims, 1998), SVM is well-suited to text classification because many topics
are linearly separable, the typical corpus has high dimensionality but few irrelevant features,
and each document vector is sparse. Joachims provided experimental evidence that SVM
“consistently achieved good performance on text classification,” tolerated large feature sets
without a need for reduction techniques, and did not require parameter tuning. None of our early
experiments with SVM and other classifiers gave us reason to go against Platt’s and Joachim’s
findings.
Why combine LSA and SVM? We used LSA in combination with SVM in our artifact
for three reasons: (1) to reduce the tendency of the NR class to dominate the model by balancing
the training data (from >99.99% NR before balancing to about 75% NR after), (2) as a feature
reduction technique (from >1500 features before the LSA transform to 200 features after), and
(3) because the LSA features are semantically richer, accounting for synonymy.
We crafted this design for the above reasons and selected it because of its high precision
and recall and low false positive rate based on cross-validation statistics, along with the ability
to fully automate construction of the “per threat” classifiers. The latter is a practical
consideration; since we will have to build a large number of classifiers for a “per threat” design
and may want to periodically rebuild the classifiers as new data is labeled, we prefer not to do
it manually. The next best design was the threat keyword design, but it required manual
intervention for every threat to extract the keywords.

Extensibility to Other Threats
Having seen promising results from the selected design, we wanted to know if these
results would extend to other CAPEC standard threats. We chose threats 66 (SQL injection),
134 (email injection), 268 (audit log manipulation), and 593 (session hijacking) according to
the same criteria we used to select threat 49. Then we compared cross-validation statistics for
models trained for these five threats before and after text improvement. The left-most five sets
of bars in Figure 5 show the precision, recall, and false positive rates for models trained for the
5 test threats before and after the text improvement. In the figure, “U” and “I” stand for
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unimproved text and improved text, respectively. The rightmost set of bars shows the mean
precision, recall, and false positive rate averaged across the 5 test threats. At a glance, this figure
shows that the cross-validation measures are better after the text improvement, except for threat
268. Because threat 268 had 1.0 precision before the text improvement, precision declined
slightly as expected when recall went up after the text improvement. As illustrated in Figure 5,
precision is between 0.86 and 1.0 and recall is between 0.86 and 0.95 for all 5 test threats for
improved text with false positive rate of 4% or less. Overall, although not a guarantee of
generality, these classifier cross-validation statistics are favorable.

Figure 5. Unimproved vs Improved Text Comparison for 5 Threats

Solution Architecture and Use Cases
For the artifact described above and evaluated below to be truly useful to the CSE in the
context of mitigation selection for cyber risk assessment, it must be incorporated into a system
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with which the CSE can interact. Appendix B describes the common use cases for the CSE’s
usage of such a system and Appendix C describes the data model and a high-level architecture
of such a system as illustrated in Figure 6. The architecture has been designed modularly and
using object-oriented principles so that any of the threat-mitigation matching techniques
investigated in this chapter could be incorporated. Some key characteristics of the system
include the following: (a) provides for models to be saved and reused to label additional
mitigations (b) persists the threats, mitigations, and known matches in a data store for reuse, (c)
is extensible to additional threats, and (d) provides a means for the CSE to view, augment, and
utilize the data.

Figure 6. Solution Architecture

Demonstration and Evaluation
Demonstration and evaluation work together to show that the artifact effectively solves
the problem. Hevner and March (Hevner & March, 2004) state a number of rigorous evaluation
methods, classifying them into the following categories: observational (e.g. case or field study),
analytical (e.g. quantitative comparisons, such as of time or cost), experiment or simulation,
testing, and descriptive (e.g. argument or scenarios). In the present research, we demonstrate
and evaluate the artifact by applying it to predict the labels for new mitigation documents that
were held aside and not used for training. The test data set consists of 276 documents, 261 of
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which were extracted from the CAPEC mitigations for threats other than 49, 66, 134, 266, and
593, and 15 of which were drawn from the Internet, 3 new relevant mitigations for each of the
5 test threats. We discuss the evaluation of the artifact in the next few paragraphs by revisiting
each solution objective stated in the Research Methodology section. Quantitative machine
learning and IR performance metrics are shown in Figure 7 and Table 3. The evaluation
conclusions are summarized in Table 4.

Figure 7. Test Results – Improved Text
Objective: Match most of the relevant mitigations for a given threat while avoiding
selection of non-relevant mitigations. This is one of the most important objectives as the
others are only germane after the artifact achieves satisfactory matching performance. As
mentioned in the design section, we experimented with several artifact designs to see which
obtained the best performance. Thus, we needed some objective measures for comparison.
Following medical SRs research, we measured recall, precision, false positive rate, specificity,
and the number of instances correct and incorrectly labeled to evaluate performance of the
artifact. We applied cross-validation, using the 10-fold approach to obtain these measures
during the training stage (Altman & Bland, 1994; Bekhuis & Demner-Fushman, 2012; Bekhuis
et al., 2014; Cohen, 2008; Cohen et al., 2006; García, Mollineda, & Sánchez, 2014;
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Jonnalagadda & Petitti, 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Matwin et al., 2010; Mo et al., 2015; Su, 1992;
Timsina et al., 2016).
During design, we used the cross-validation statistics output during training to compare
the model designs, deciding which to advance or leave behind. Although suitable for comparing
models, these measures are not definitive for new document instances. During the evaluation
stage, we re-evaluated the classifiers on test data held aside and not used during training as is
customary in machine learning evaluation. We computed the recall, precision, false positive
rate, and specificity by comparing the predicted and actual labels for the test instances. Figure
7 and Table 3 show the test results on the improved text for five threats. These results are
discussed in more detail in the next few paragraphs.
Recall that training measures yielded precision and recall > 0.93 for the NR class. This
foreshadowed excellent discernment of the NR class. Although we are most interested in the R
class, the model’s ability to discriminate NR instances is also a benefit. Test results for precision
and recall on the NR class lived up to the promises made by the training statistics. In addition,
all five models had high specificity (97-100%) meaning at least 97% labor savings for the CSE
when compared to totally manually matching efforts because the models are very good at
accurately discarding non-relevant documents.
For the R class, training measures yielded precision between 0.86 and 1.00 (mean 0.94),
recall between 0.86 and 0.95 (mean 0.90), and FP rate between 0 and 4% (mean 2%). During
testing, the models all yielded 1.00 recall on the R class, performing better than anticipated
based on cross-validation statistics. This means each of the models excels at recognizing
relevant mitigations for its designated threat and thus we are not likely to ignore relevant
mitigations. Unfortunately, precision during testing was lower than anticipated (between 0.27
and 0.75, mean 0.40). For the 266 test instances, there were between 0 and 8 false positives (03%) per threat. In practical usage, we can tolerate a few false positives in our approach but,
similar to the process of medical SRs, we would have to have CSE review of the mitigations
labeled as relevant as illustrated in the architecture in Figure 3 and Appendix C before recording
them in a knowledge base as reusable recommendations.
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Table 3. “Per Threat” Test Summary - Improved Text
Threat Class
49
66
134
268
593

R
NR
R
NR
R
NR
R
NR
R
NR

Precision

P@3

0.75
1.00
0.27
1.00
0.30
1.00
0.38
1.00
0.30
1.00

1.00
1.00 (*)
1.00 (*)
1.00 (*)
1.00 (*)

Recall
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.97
1.00
0.97
1.00
0.98
1.00
0.97

FP
Specificity
Rate
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.02
0.97
0.00
1.00
0.03
0.97
0.00
1.00
0.02
0.98
0.00
1.00
0.03
0.97
0.00
1.00

#
Correct
3
272
3
265
3
266
3
268
3
266

#
Incorrect
0
1
0
8
0
7
0
5
0
7

Precision @ K, discussed in the Literature Review, is a measure of precision commonly
applied in text retrieval applications. We considered P@K for all 5 models; we used K=3
because we knew in advance that our test data set contained exactly 3 relevant mitigations per
threat. For threat 49, there were 4 positive predictions, 3 correct and 1 false positive. The correct
predictions were ranked in the top 3, each with 1.0 probability and the false positive was ranked
fourth at 0.51 probability. Thus, P@3 for threat 49 is 1.0. For threat 66, there were 11 positive
predictions, 3 correct and 8 FPs. All 3 of the TPs were ranked at 1.0, but 5 FPs were also ranked
at 1.0. This complicated the P@K calculation because any of the 8 items ranked 1.0 could be
in the top 3. We found sparse treatment of tie-breaking for P@K in the literature. A simplistic
but commonly accepted approach for dealing with ties from TREC5 (National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2005) is to choose one of the possible orderings and evaluate P@K
for it. One such ordering is for all the positive instances to be in the top 3 and, thus, P@3 would
be 1.0. However, this is admittedly very optimistic (indicated with * in Table 3) as other
arbitrary orderings of the results could yield appreciably different results for P@3, including
0.0, 0.33, and 0.67. McSherry and Najork proposed an alternative method for computing P@K
which accounts for ties by averaging P@K over all the possible orderings (McSherry & Najork,
2008). There are 40,320 possible orderings for the 8 samples labeled positive for threat 66 and
over half of them would contain 3 NR entries (P@3=0.0). These would drive the average down

5

For more than 25 years, Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) has been a pre-eminent information retrieval
conference supporting text retrieval research with large test corpi and uniform scoring procedures to facilitate
comparison of results. It is sponsored by NIST. https://trec.nist.gov/
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dramatically; thus, without implementing McSherry’s measure, we estimated that it would be
not be better than the value in the precision column. Similarly, for threat 134, there were 10
positive predictions, 9 of which were ranked at 1.0 including the 3 known positives; for threat
268, there were 6 positive predictions, 6 of which were ranked at 1.0 including the 3 known
positives; and for threat 593, there were 10 positive predictions, 9 of which were ranked at 1.0
including the 3 known positives. The bottom line is P@K did not help with evaluation as much
as we originally thought it would due to the ties.
We ultimately based evaluation of our artifact on recall, specificity, and false positive
rate as shown in Figure 7 and Table 3. These measures are defined in Equations 1, 2, and 3.
Recall is the probability that all relevant documents will be retrieved. Specificity is the
probability that all non-relevant documents will be ruled out. False positive rate is the
probability that a non-relevant document will be retrieved. As Powers points out, taken alone,
precision and recall tend to understate a method’s ability to correctly identify non-relevant
instances (Powers, 2007). This ability is measured using specificity, and we think it is important
for threat-mitigation mapping because ruling out true negatives can lead to substantial workload
reduction for the CSE.
(Equation 1)

=

+
(Equation 2)

=
=

+
(Equation 3)
+

In summary, with recall of the R class registering 1.00 on test data for all 5 models, we
can be confident that the model will not overlook relevant mitigations. This is desirable because
we do not want to obscure any relevant mitigations from the CSE’s view. With a false positive
rate between 0 and 3% and specificity between 0.97 and 1.00, we are encouraged that the model
will reliably eliminate instances that are not in the R class. Precision is lower than we desired
and with this comes a few false positives. This shortfall can be mitigated in practice by
providing for CSE screening of the recommended matches before they are committed to the
knowledge base for reuse. The high precision (1.00), recall (>0.97), and specificity (1.00) of
the NR class means the models will accurately eliminate most (>97%) of the NR instances
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without any manual intervention, greatly reducing the CSE workload when compared to purely
manual matching and leaving just a few false positives for the CSE to remediate. In a practical
setting where the objective would be to build a reusable knowledge base of threat-mitigation
mappings, this remediation activity would only have to be done for new matches.
Objective: Process existing English language text documents where each
separately describes either a threat or a mitigation. The CAPEC dataset and the additional
example mitigations are English language documents. During the training and testing of each
trial design, we demonstrated that the artifact accepts these English language text documents
about threats and mitigations.
Objective: Provide an automated method for recommending (matching) relevant
mitigations when presented with a threat. During training and testing, we demonstrated that
the artifact will label mitigations as relevant or not relevant to a given threat.
Objective: Accommodate (be extensible to) new and evolving threats and
mitigations. During testing we demonstrated that the artifact can accept new mitigations which
it will label as relevant or not relevant on a “per threat” basis using a stored model trained from
labeled data. The method can also accept new threats with the caveat that labeled data consisting
of known relevant mitigations for the threat will have to be created so that a model can be
trained.
Objective: Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in mitigation selection. MerriamWebster equates utility with usefulness and “practical worth or applicability” (“Usefulness,”
2019). Hevner et al. emphasize that “the artifact works and does what it is meant to
do…achieving its goals.” (Gregor & Hevner, 2013) Finally, according to Raghavan et al. the
“usefulness of a retrieval system is determined to a great extent by how closely it can
characterize the dichotomy” of relevant vs non-relevant documents for its intended purpose
(Raghavan et al., 1989). We use these definitions to assert a reasoned argument for utility of
the artifact. We have shown that the artifact meets the objectives we set forth at the beginning
of the research in 5 test cases, and especially that it matches most of the relevant mitigations
for a given threat while ruling out at least 97% of the non-relevant mitigations. These results
are favorable for utility, but we leave formal utility assessment to future work after the artifact
has been operationalized into a system such as the one in Figure 6.
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Objective: Be able to be used in a system that allows for reuse of the artifact and
the matches produced by the artifact. The solution produces models that can be saved and
reused. As described in the architecture section, if the artifact were to be operationalized in an
architecture such as the one in Figure 6, the system could provide for models to be saved and
reused to label new mitigations as they are encountered. The threat documents, mitigation
documents, and labeled matches between the two could be persisted in a data store so that they
can be reused to satisfy threat queries by the CSE. A user interface could allow the documents
and matches to be viewed and utilized.
Evaluation Summary. In Chapter 1 we motivated the problem of matching mitigations
to cyber threats and in Chapter 3 we set forth objectives for a solution to that hard problem. We
evaluated the artifact against those objectives and showed that it achieves its goals. Table 4
summarizes the artifact evaluation based on the solution objectives stated in the Research
Methodology section above. To show practical worth and applicability, we provided use cases
and an architecture into which the artifact can be integrated for practical use by cybersecurity
professionals engaged in cyber risk assessment. In particular, we produced a method for
automatically matching mitigations to threats that is both extensible and reusable and that will
match most of the relevant mitigations for a given threat while avoiding selection of nonrelevant mitigations. Moreover, five instantiations of the method accurately eliminated most
(>97%) of the non-relevant mitigations without any manual intervention, leaving just a few
false positives for the CSE to remediate manually. This robust discrimination of the R and NR
classes aligns with Raghavan’s definition of usefulness for retrieval systems (Raghavan et al.,
1989).
Table 4. Evaluation Results Based on Solution Objectives
Objective

Evaluation

Process existing English language text

Pass. By testing, we demonstrated that the

documents where each separately

artifact accepts English language text

describes either a threat or a mitigation

documents about threats and mitigations.

Provide an automated method for

Pass. By testing, we demonstrated that the

recommending (matching) relevant

artifact proposes matching mitigations when a

mitigations when presented with a threat

threat is given.
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Objective

Evaluation

Match most of the relevant mitigations

Pass. By evaluation of the models on test

for a given threat while avoiding

data, we demonstrated that the models can

selection of non-relevant mitigations

eliminate about 97% of non-relevant
mitigations. Moreover, with recall at 1.00, it
will not overlook relevant mitigations.

Accommodate (be extensible to) new and

Pass. The artifact can accept new mitigations

evolving threats and mitigations

which it will match to existing threats using a
stored model trained from labeled data. The
method can also accept new threats with the
caveat that labeled data consisting of known
relevant mitigations for the threat would have
to be created so that a model can be trained.

Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in

Pass. By satisfying the preceding objectives,

mitigation selection

the artifact as instantiated provides practical
value and to the CSE engaged in cyber risk
assessment and meets the utility criteria for
retrieval systems established by (Raghavan et
al., 1989). It has potential to reduce CSE
workload by about 97% over purely manual
matching.

Be able to be used in a system that allows

Pass. The artifact provides models that can be

for reuse of the artifact and the matches

saved and reused to label additional

produced by the artifact

mitigations at a later time. The artifact could
be used in a system such as the one shown in
Figure 6 where the threats, mitigations, and
matches could be persisted in a data store and
a user interface could be provided to allow
this data to be viewed and reused.
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Validity

Figure 8. Validity
Validity centers on interactions between the theoretical and observational research
planes (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006) as illustrated in Figure 8. Constructs in the theoretical plane
are intangible. In our research, the major constructs are cyber threats, mitigations, and a
cognitive process that matches appropriate mitigations to threats. We operationalized these
intangible ideas in the observational plane order to conduct the research. In our case, as shown
in Figure 8, we operationalized threats and mitigations as textual documents describing
instances of each of the corresponding constructs and we operationalized the cognitive
matching process in our artifact. In the context of DSRM, Hevner et al. mention validity in the
context of artifact evaluation stating that “validity means that the artifact works and does what
it is meant to do; that it is dependable in operational terms in achieving its goals.” (Gregor &
Hevner, 2013) The types of validity commonly discussed in scholarly research include, face
validity, construct validity, internal validity, and external validity. In addition, Lukyanenko et
al. recently put forth the concept of instantiation validity specifically for Design Science
(Lukyanenko & Parsons, 2014).
Face validity is a subjective assessment about whether the operationalization of the
research constructs make sense when taken at face value. We argue for face validity of our
operationalizations of the threat and mitigation constructs on the basis that the textual
documents represent the traditional method by which such knowledge is codified. Likewise,
the artifact parallels the cognitive matching process that the experts perform in their brains.
Construct validity is “the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from
the operationalizations in a study to the theoretical constructs on which those
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operationalizations were based” - in other words that the operationalizations are reasonable
indicators of the underlying latent concepts (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). While there are tests
for construct validity in quantitative research (e.g., convergent and discriminant validity), the
picture is less clear for Design Science. One major threat to construct validity is failure to
properly understand and explain the constructs before operationalizing them.

We have

addressed this threat via our Literature Review of the pertinent content domains.
Trochim defines internal validity as “the approximate truth about inferences regarding
cause-effect or causal relationships” and furthermore asserts that “internal validity is only
relevant in studies that try to establish a causal relationship.” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006) Our
research does not seek to establish a causal relationship; therefore, internal validity is mentioned
here for completeness but is not pertinent to our research since we are not trying to establish
causality.
External validity “is the degree to which the conclusions in the study would hold for
other persons in other places and at other times” also referred to as generalizability (Trochim
& Donnelly, 2006). The generalizability we seek is that our method applies to more threats
than the 5 we tested here. We see initial indications of generality from similarities in the 5 test
cases; however, the method must be applied to additional and more diverse sources of threats
and mitigations before we can be sure.
Instantiation validity is an assessment of how well an artifact created via Design
Science Research instantiates constructs of the theory on which the artifact is based
(Lukyanenko & Parsons, 2014). We have addressed and promoted instantiation validity in our
research by appropriate alignment of the artifact with literature in the problem domains per the
Literature Review and by developing the artifact using a rigorous approach as described in the
Design and Development of the Artifact section.

Communication
Communication of research results to both practitioner and scholarly audiences is a key
tenet of Design Science Research. Via a combination of UML drawings and prose, sufficiently
detailed design documentation has been created to convey the construction details of the
artifact. Per Hevner, this enables “practitioners to take advantage of the benefits” (Hevner &
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March, 2004) while also promoting critical feedback and opportunities for extension by the
research community. This dissertation satisfies the communication requirement of the DSRM.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In this research, we set out to devise a method for matching mitigations to cyber threats
expressed as English language text documents using machine learning and text retrieval
techniques in support of cyber risk assessment. In the preceding chapters, we have discussed an
iterative process framed within the Design Science Research Method where we evaluated and
down-selected designs by comparing their respective measures of performance. We ultimately
arrived at a matching method that achieves the stated objectives and we instantiated 5 examples
as SVM “per threat” classifiers based on LSA features. We rigorously evaluated the
instantiations in 5 test cases and were encouraged by the results. We illustrated the utility of the
method by describing an architecture into which it can be integrated for practical use. Overall,
we are encouraged by the results achieved thus far.

Contributions
Mitigation selection to remediate cyber threats has heretofore been primarily a manual
process done by human experts using textual sources which are extensive and disparate.
Reliance solely on human experts brings issues of scalability, consistency, and repeatability.
The ongoing shortage of cybersecurity experts combined with a burgeoning cyber threat
landscape compelled us to look for a way to improve this situation.
This research contributes to theory by taking steps towards a novel machine learning
method for automatically mapping mitigations to threats, both expressed as English language
text, and demonstrating instantiations of the method. Moreover, the research fills a research gap
in the cyber risk assessment literature by providing a semi-automated method to produce a
starting list of possible mitigations for threats identified during risk assessment providing the
data needed to flow into mitigation optimization techniques. The method is extensible to
accommodate the continued evolution of both cyber threats and mitigations, an important
consideration in light of the dynamic cyber landscape. We have also demonstrated one way to
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improve the textual descriptions of threats and mitigations to better support automated
matching.
From a practical perspective, our method for matching mitigations to threats benefits all
threat-informed cyber risk assessment approaches by providing a means to recommend relevant
mitigations to remediate specific threats thereby aiding decision-making for IS stakeholders
and cybersecurity experts. This is important because under-mitigating the actual threats
provides a false sense of security while over-mitigating is costly and wasteful. When
operationalized into a knowledge base, such as the one shown in Figure 6, where models and
matches can be saved for reuse, the method may make mitigation selection more repeatable,
facilitate knowledge reuse, save CSE time and labor, and extend the reach of cybersecurity
experts who are currently in short supply. The list of mitigations applicable to each threat can
serve as input into analyses of alternatives, enabling practitioners to leverage a large body of
mitigation optimization research. Finally, the method can respond to the evolutionary nature of
cyber threats and mitigations. Thus, it may improve overall security of cyber systems when
used as part of a risk assessment and mitigation cycle such as the one shown in Figure 1 by
making more frequent reassessments of cyber systems feasible.

Lessons Learned from the Text
In Chapter 4 Analysis of the Text, we identified that improving the mitigation texts to
include an explanation of how each one addresses the threat would improve the match results
by reducing the FNs. During the research, we noted domain-specific peculiarities in the
documents. A number of issues are known to affect text-based processing in general, including
synonymy, polysemy, misspellings, colloquialisms, and the use of acronyms and jargon. The
cyber threat-mitigation matching problem suffered from all of these issues and, in addition,
varying styles (e.g. prose versus bullets), varying degrees of brevity and verbosity, extraneous
information (e.g. “this may be prohibitively expensive”), and expressions in the negative (i.e.
what not to do). References to product names and technical standards sometimes served as
short-hand, obscuring complex concepts. We also encountered considerable sameness in the
language used to express different threats (e.g., SQL injection, email injection, script injection
as well as some mitigations which apply to multiple threats (e.g., multifactor authentication,
encryption, training). These conditions worked against discernment of relevance. Data
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imbalance favoring the non-relevant class, limited matching mitigations per threat, and
erroneous mappings presented tactical issues for classifier training.

Future Work
For this initial proof of concept research, we bounded the scope, providing ample
opportunities for incremental improvements. The method we developed was instantiated and
tested with English language documents. It would be interesting to extend it to other languages.
Likewise, our instantiations were based on a narrow slice of cybersecurity documents. The
method could be improved by exposure to more threat and mitigation sources. We made no
effort to address redundant threats and mitigations in our corpus. In order to ingest documents
from additional sources, the method should be preceded by an automated approach for dealing
with duplication. In addition, analyses of the structure and semantics of threat and mitigation
documents from various sources could lead to discovery of additional ways to improve the
document content and by extension the matching method.
We used supervised machine learning which required some pre-existing matches. This
work could be extended by investigating semi-supervised learning classification techniques to
build classifiers for new threats where labeled data does not yet exist. Moreover, it is possible
that semi-supervised learning could also be used to improve the classifiers initially trained for
existing threats by taking into account new matches that come about as new mitigation
documents are added.
We focused our research on defensive cybersecurity, identifying threats and seeking to
determine relevant mitigations. It is possible that our method may be applicable or extensible
to “white hat” offensive cybersecurity, such as to better understand attacker behavior or residual
exposure. This perspective is characterized by identifying the mitigations present in a system
and seeking to determine threats to counter them. Moreover, while we established a degree of
utility for our method by demonstrating that the artifact solves the problem for 5 examples,
survey research to investigate the perceived utility by actual CSEs would be beneficial.
Finally, we identify several lofty goals for future extensions of this research. Improving
the ways that threat and mitigation text is written, such as by addressing the limitations
described in the Lessons Learned section, could improve the method. Furthermore, devising a
robust ontology to capture the intricacy of threat/mitigation relationships would offer great
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potential to improve the matches, helping to tease out complexities such as overlapping threats
and one to many mitigation-threat mappings. This structure could be used as metadata to
improve the matching models. In the long term, we envision the matcher as a component of an
overarching architecture with a reusable, continually evolving, peer-reviewed knowledge base
of threat-mitigation mappings with contributions coming from many sources, including threat
frameworks, mitigation catalogs and vendor literature.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF CYBER TERMS
In this appendix we define a few important cyber terms that recur in our dissertation.
•

We use the word cyber to denote associations with the information technology
(IT) and information systems (IS) domains, including computers, computer
networks, hardware, and software.

•

A cyber system is a system composed of IT/IS components, though it may also
encompass non-cyber entities. Smart phones, automated teller machines, home
automation systems, digital cameras, e-commerce platforms, and even the
Internet are all examples of cyber systems of various sizes.

•

A cyber vulnerability is a known or unknown weakness in a cyber system.
When we hear vulnerability, we most often think of software flaws, but cyber
systems are also vulnerable to a number of other conditions, such as natural
disasters and human error.

•

A cyber threat is any adverse event, regardless of intent, that disrupts a cyber
system by activating a vulnerability. Common threats include errors, routine
failures, natural disasters, and cyberattacks.

•

A cyberattack is a purposeful “attempt to damage, disrupt, or gain access to” a
cyber system (Random House Inc., n.d.). Cyberattacks are often undertaken for
nefarious purposes, though sometimes they may be pranks.

•

We use the term cyber effect to refer to the outcome after a cyber threat has
been realized. Cyber effects are most commonly categorized in terms of loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the cyber system or one of its parts.

•

Risk is a condition faced by an organization or entity. It encompasses the
likelihood that a threat or adverse event will occur and the degree of damage or
injury (also known in organizational contexts as mission impact) if the threat is
realized.
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•

Cyber risk is the risk that an organization or entity faces due to its association
with or reliance on cyber systems.

•

Mitigations represent tools or techniques that may counter or reduce the impact
of cyber threats. In this paper, we consider the terms security controls and
countermeasures to be synonymous with mitigations.

•

Risk assessment, according to Kaplan and Garrick, is an attempt “to envision
how the future will turn out if we undertake a certain course of action (or
inaction).” (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). In the case of cyber risk assessment, the
objectives are to understand and prioritize identified cyber risks in order to
understand the status quo and determine mitigating courses of action for high
priority threats.
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APPENDIX B. USE CASES
The following use cases describe the main uses of a system such as the one illustrated
in the drawing in Figure 6 and described in detail in Appendix C. Instantiations of the artifact
of this research can be a key part of such a system that would allow a CSE to leverage the
practical utility of the artifact. We refer to these instantiations as the Matcher. Each Matcher is
a classifier for a particular threat that; it labels new potential mitigation document instances as
relevant to the given threat. Each instantiation of the Matcher comes to exist by virtue of a
model building process shown in Figure 4. In the notional architecture in Figure 6, we have
allocated the process of creating new Matcher instantiations to the Preprocessor. Use cases 1
and 2 relate to the Matcher (artifact). Use cases 3 through 7 relate to a system such as the one
depicted in Figure 6 which would encompass the artifact and support practical usage of it.
Use Case 1

Label potential mitigations relevant or not relevant to a specified
threat

Preconditions

Unlabeled potential mitigation documents exist to be labeled.
A model (classifier) and semantic space exist that can be used to
determine the relevance of new mitigation documents for the
specified threat, T.

Success End Condition

Unlabeled mitigations have been labeled relevant or not relevant
to T.

Actors

Matcher

Description

1. The Matcher pertinent to T ingests unlabeled potential
mitigations.
2. The Matcher transforms each mitigation, M, to the features of
the semantic space.
3. The Matcher applies the classifier to each transformed M.
4. The Matcher outputs a relevant or non-relevant label and a
confidence value for each M relative to T.
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Use Case 2

Create a model for a new threat

Preconditions

A new threat, T, exists.
At least n labeled mitigations relevant to T and at least m nonrelevant instances exist. (We arbitrarily used 20 for n and 200 for
m.)

Success End Condition

A model (classifier) and semantic space exist that can be used to
determine the relevance of new mitigation documents for the
specified threat, T.

Actors

Preprocessor (Model Builder)

Description

1. The Model Builder applies LSA to create a threat-specific
semantic space from the provided labeled mitigations.
2. The Model Builder saves the semantic space and the labels.
3. The Model Builder uses T as a query against the semantic
space returning mitigations in order from most to least relevant T.
4. The Model Builder makes training data from the top 100
mitigations and trains a classifier for T.

Variations

Use Case 3

Get a list of relevant mitigations for a given threat

Preconditions

Threat documents, mitigation documents, and mappings exist.
A model exists that can determine the relevance of new
mitigation documents for the given threat.

Success End Condition

A list of relevant mitigation documents for the given threat has
been produced.

Actors

CSE, System

Description

1. The CSE specifies an existing threat T and requests a list of
relevant mitigations.
2. If there are any unmapped mitigations in the system, the
system first performs use case 4 to map them.
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Use Case 3

Get a list of relevant mitigations for a given threat
3. The system selects all mitigations labeled as R for threat T and
returns the mitigation id, text, relevance indicator, relevance
score, relevance source, verified indicator, and verified source.

Use Case 4

Classify unmapped mitigations relative to a specified threat

Preconditions

Threat documents, mitigation documents, and mappings exist.
Some new mitigations exist that are not yet mapped to any threat.
A model exists that can predict the relevance of new mitigation
documents for the given threat.

Success End Condition

New mitigations have been labeled with their relevance to the
specified threat and marked as unverified.

Actors

System

Description

1. The system loads the appropriate model to classify unlabeled
mitigations for the specified threat, T.
2. The system applies the threat-specific model to the unlabeled
mitigations.
3. The model predicts and outputs a label and a confidence value
for each unlabeled mitigation to indicate its relevance or nonrelevance to T as described in use case 1.
4. The system saves the threat-specific label determinations and
relevance scores for each previously unlabeled mitigation, and
marks the mapping as not verified.

Variations

Future: The system automatically marks new mappings verified
when the confidence exceeds an established value C.

Use Case 5

Add a new mitigation

Preconditions

The CSE has a new mitigation to add.
The CSE has verified that the mitigation to be added is not
already in the data store.
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Use Case 5

Add a new mitigation

Success End Condition

The new mitigation has been added to the system and is ready to
be labeled upon request.

Actors

CSE, System

Description

1. The CSE requests to add the new mitigation to the data store.
2. The system accepts and saves the new mitigation.

Variations

Future: The system automatically detects and prevents addition
of duplicate mitigations.

Use Case 6

Add a new threat

Preconditions

The CSE has a new threat to add.
The CSE has at least n labeled mitigations relevant to the threat.
The CSE has verified that the threat to be added is not already in
the data store.

Success End Condition

The new threat, associated relevant mitigations, and verified
mappings have been added to the system and a model has been
created to handle the new threat.

Actors

CSE, System

Description

1. The CSE requests to add the new threat, T, and associated
mitigations to the system.
2. The system accepts and saves the new threat, mitigations, and
mappings for the relevant mitigations provided. The mappings
are marked as verified.
3. The system trains a new model for T per use case 2 using the
provided labeled data and m negative instances drawn at random
from the mappings already in the system.
4. The system saves the model for future use.

Variations

Future: The system automatically detects and prevents addition
of duplicate threats.
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Use Case 7

Review/adjudicate matches

Preconditions

Mappings exists in the data store.

Success End Condition

The status has been changed for requested mappings.

Actors

CSE, System

Description

1. The CSE requests to review unverified mappings, potentially
specifying a confidence threshold.
2. The system presents the new mappings to the CSE.
3. For each mapping,
a. The CSE approves, rejects, or skips.
b. For approved or rejected mappings, the system saves
the action.

Variations

Future: The system also allows the CSE to review existing
mappings by specifying selection criteria. This could be used to
correct errors that made it past the review process.
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APPENDIX C. SOLUTION ARCHITECTURE
Design and Architecture
In order for the approach described in Chapter 4 to be useful to the cybersecurity expert
in the context of cyber risk assessment, it must exist within a system with which the CSE can
interact. This appendix describes the data model and an overall architecture for such a system.
It has been designed modularly and using object-oriented principles so that any of the threatmitigation matching techniques investigated in this research could be incorporated as the
Matcher.

Data Model
In this section, we present a logical view and description of the data types and
relationships inherent in the artifact (Figure C.1). Note that, although this data model is based
on the CAPEC data, it is not limited to CAPEC and is intended to be extensible to threat and
mitigation documents from other sources.
Catalog is the main object. It is a container for all the threats, mitigations, and associated
mappings. Each Threat has a unique identifier (ID), a short title, and a description which can
be verbose. A threat may have one of three levels of Abstraction (meta, standard, or detailed).
We are focusing on CAPEC threats at the standard level of abstraction, because they have the
best balance of specificity versus generality for our purposes. Meta threats represent groupings
of similar threats, accessed via the ParentThreat property of a standard threat. Mitigations at the
meta level are associated to the standard threats that are children of the meta threat. The
DomainOfAttack (e.g. hardware, software, communications) and MechanismOfAttack (e.g.
subvert access control) properties are also used to group related threats. Detailed threats are
further refinements of standard threats, accessible via the ImmediateChildren property.
KeyPhrases are significant words or phrases extracted from the threat title and description
which succinctly represent the meaning of the threat.
Each Mitigation has a unique identifier (ID), a short title, and a description, which can
be verbose. The DomainOfAttack (e.g. hardware, software, communications) and
MechanismOfAttack (e.g. subvert access control) properties are also used to group mitigations
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that counter certain related categories of threats. KeyPhrases are significant words or phrases
extracted from the mitigation title and description, which succinctly represent the meaning of
the mitigation.

Figure C.1. Overall Data Model
A Mapping object represents a threat and mitigation pair, represented by a ThreatID
and MitigationID, respectively. The IsRelevant and IsVerified properties are used to indicate
the strength of the match. When IsRelevant is true, this means that the mitigation is a
countermeasure for the threat, either because it was extracted based on a CAPEC threatmitigation mapping, or, if a new mitigation, as a result of a decision by the Matcher. When
IsVerified is true, this means that the match has been independently verified. IsVerified and
IsRelevant will always be true for matches extracted from CAPEC. For decisions made by the
Matcher, IsRelevant will be true but IsVerified will initially be false until a SME concurs with
the match. Mappings where IsRelevant and IsVerified are both true can be used as training data.
Mappings where IsRelevant is false are not usually stored, except for diagnostic purposes.
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Architecture Overview
Figures C.2 and C.3 illustrate the architecture into which instantiations of the threatmitigation matcher can be inserted. Figure C.2 illustrates the preprocessor architecture. During
Data Extraction, the CAPEC XML structure described in the Data Source and One-time Data
Preparation section above is unpacked and transformed into the structure shown in Figure C.1
and described above.

Figure C.2. Preprocessor Architecture
Preprocessor. The Preprocessor includes these functions: (a) convert the threat and
mitigation text into threat documents, mitigation documents, and matches, (b) create indices to
support the LSA representations of the documents, and (c) train model(s) as needed for the
matcher. In (a) the threat and mitigation texts extracted from CAPEC are lower-cased,
tokenized, and stemmed. In this architecture, a model will be trained for each threat then saved
for reuse when matching is necessary. Over time, after substantial additional labeled data has
been accumulated through the use of the system, it may make sense to train new models to take
advantage of the new semantic knowledge provided.
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Figure C.3. Matcher Architecture
Matcher. The Matcher, shown in Figure C.3, is the main component of this research. It
is executed on demand. To control the scope of the research, we assumed a fixed set of threat
documents and a clear delineation between threats and mitigations. We decided to fix the pool
of threats because our approach relies on the pre-existence of labeled data consisting of
mitigations known to be relevant to the threat. We assumed that a document consists of either
a threat or a mitigation but not both so that we did not have to invent a way to separate composite
documents into the requisite parts. Our approach can accept new mitigations which it will match
to existing threats. It can also accept new threats with the caveat that labeled data consisting of
known relevant mitigations would have to be created so that a classifier can be trained.
The Matcher uses the data output from the Preprocessor. It is implemented as described
in Chapter 4 to select relevant mitigations for a given threat. Existing threats, mitigations, and
matches extracted from CAPEC reside in their respective data stores as a result of data
extraction and preprocessing. New mitigations are classified as relevant or not relevant to a
selected threat by applying the models previously trained and stored. Each match is written to
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the Matches data store as a row that references a threat, a matching mitigation, the rank of the
match (if applicable), and a flag to designate matches considered to be ground truth, such as
from training data or SME confirmation. Matches recorded from the labeled data will be flagged
as verified. Matches generated by the Matcher will initially be flagged as unverified.
Review. The review function allows a subject matter expert to examine new matches
generated by the Matcher. The SME can confirm the match or indicate that the given threatmitigation pair is NR. It is not required that all generated matches must be reviewed. Initially
that may be the practice, but as experience is gained in practical use, it may be that some new
matches can be confirmed based on the model’s confidence in the match leaving only the least
confident matches for SME review. Regardless of how review is handled, we think it is
important to present the review status of each returned match to CSE who requests a list of
mitigations for a given threat. This will help the CSE to compensate for errors in precision
where a mitigation that is not relevant may be erroneously presented.
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APPENDIX D. DESIGN TRIALS
This appendix discusses details for each design iteration. At the outset, we had three
design concepts for the threat-mitigation matcher artifact: classification, ranked retrieval, and a
hybrid of the two. We explored a number of designs, including various classifiers, feature sets,
and feature reduction techniques.

Classification
In this section we discuss the iterative process for applying classification in the design
of our artifact. Following the medical SR literature discussed above in the Literature Review,
we started with a single threat and some labeled mitigation data that contains instances that are
relevant and not relevant to the threat. We designate this as the “per-threat” approach. In order
for the “per threat” approach to solve the problem at hand, we would have to eventually train a
classifier for each existing threat and likewise for new threats that come along; however, this
does not seem like an unreasonable requirement. New threats do come along, but the library of
known threats is relatively stable over time. In the ten months since we started this research,
the CAPEC dataset has undergone two subsequent releases but only two new standard threats
have been added to CAPEC. Tables D.1 and D.2 summarize several design iterations on the
“per threat” approach, each of which is discussed in more detail following the tables. Later on,
we discuss several trials where we experimented with a “one for all” approach.
Table D.1. “Per Threat” Summary of Classification Iterations – Full Text
#
1

Trial
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation
Features:
• Mitigation text,
• R/NR indicator
Filter: StringToWordVector
• TFIDF
• Lower case
• Word tokenization
(removes punctuation)

Class
R
NR

P
R
FP
F
C
I
0.25 0.11 0.01 0.15
1
8
0.99 0.99 0.89 0.99 601
3

78
#

2

3

4

Trial
• Stemming
• Eliminate stop words
• Retain 1,000 words
Classifier: Weka SMO
Same as trial 1 except
Attribute selection: top 50
attributes based on information
gain
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation
Features:
• Mitigation text
• R/NR indicator
Filter: StringToWordVector
• TFIDF
• Lower case
• Word tokenization
(removes punctuation)
• Stemming
• Eliminate stop words
• Retain 1,679 words
Classifier: Weka SMO
Same as trial 5 plus attribute
selection: top 200 attributes based
on information gain

Class

P

R

FP

F

C

I

R
NR

0.50
0.99

0.11
0.99

0.00
0.89

0.18
0.99

1
603

8
1

R
NR

0.92
0.98

0.48
0.99

0.00
0.52

0.63
0.99

12
611

13
1

R
N

0.83
0.99

0.39 0.002
0.99 0.62

0.53
0.99

5
599

8
1

Trial 1
In the first trial, we made a training data set consisting of one row for each mitigation,
where each row contained the mitigation text and an attribute to indicate if the mitigation is or
is not relevant (R/NR) to threat 49. This data set was extremely unbalanced, containing 9 items
in the R class and 604 (>99%) in the NR class. The input dataset was preprocessed in Weka by
applying a StringToWordVector filter using TFIDF weighting, lower case, word tokenization,
stemming, and stop word elimination, retaining 1,000 words. We trained a SMO model from
the filtered data set. The only good thing to be said about this model is the false positive rate
for the R class is low. Precision and recall for the R class (0.25/0.11) were worse than the flip
of a coin; hence, unacceptable.
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Trial 2
In the second trial, we made a training data set and applied the filter as described in trial
1, then selected the top 50 attributes using information gain. We trained a SMO model using
the filtered and reduced data set. This resulted in improved precision (0.50) for the R class and
maintained the low false positive rate, but recall was still poor (0.11).
As expected, the models in trials 1 and 2 were both very good at correctly classifying
non-relevant instances due to the class imbalance in the data, but they were not good at correctly
classifying relevant instances, likely for the same reason. It became apparent that it was
necessary to do something about the class imbalance. In addition, note that this approach did
not utilize any information from the threat; thus, such an approach may not generalize to other
threats. This ultimately led us to try the keyword approach described later in trials 5 and 6.

Trial 3
In trial 3, we followed the method described in trial 1, except we retained 1,679 words
from the StringToWordVector filter. We selected the number 1,679 to facilitate comparison
with the LSA ranked retrieval results in trials 9 and 10 discussed later (1,679 was the number
of unique words identified during the LSA transformation). We did not perform any attribute
reduction. We trained a SMO model from the filtered data set, achieving precision of 0.92,
recall of 0.48, and minimal false positives for the R class. This is an improvement over the prior
trials and suggests that retaining more words is better. Precision and recall for the NR class
were 0.98 and 0.99, respectively. As mentioned previously, the dataset is highly imbalanced in
favor of the NR class but we are primarily interested in the R class. For the R class, precision
in this trial was good (0.92), but recall was not good enough. There are only a small number of
relevant mitigation documents for a given threat and at 50% recall, we would be failing to
recommend over half of them.

Trial 4
In trial 4, we made a training dataset similar to the one in trial 3, but used attribute
selection to choose the top 200 attributes based on information gain. We trained a SMO model
from the filtered and reduced data set, achieving precision and recall (0.83/0.39) for the R class
and (0.99/0.99) for the majority NR class. Recall and precision here were worse than trial 3,
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suggesting that the additional words do add some information to the model, which is lost during
the information gain reduction.
Table D.2. “Per Threat” Summary of Classification Iterations – Keywords
#
5

6

Trial
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, 2/3 undersampling of the
NR class
Features:
• Presence/absence of threat
keywords (TextRank +
synonyms) in mitigation text
• R/NR indicator
Filter:
• Lower case
• Eliminate stop words and
punctuation
Classifier: Weka SMO
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, 2/3 undersampling of the
NR class instances and 100%
SMOTE oversampling of the R class
Features:
• Presence/absence of threat
keywords in mitigation text
• R/NR indicator
Filter:
• Lower case
• Eliminate stop words and
punctuation
Classifier: Weka SMO

Class P
R
FP
F
C
I
R
0.82 0.67 0.00 0.74
14
3
NR
0.97 0.99 0.33 0.98 207
7

R

0.97

0.74 0.00

0.84

31

1

NR

0.95

1.00 0.24

0.97

211

11

Trial 5
An inspection of the mitigation text for the 9 relevant examples in trial 2 revealed that
those which were correctly classified have in common some key words from threat 49
suggesting keywords/phrases as a possible way to introduce information from the threat text
into the approach, while also potentially improving the classification results. Table D.3 shows
the keywords/phrases automatically extracted by TextRank for threat 49 and its associated
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mitigations. Some of these keywords were rather rough, so we decided to clean them up
manually. The improved keywords are also shown in the table. While it would be nice in the
long run (assuming an approach based on keywords bears fruit) to automate the keyword/phrase
extraction, it will suffice to prove the concept if we use expert-assigned keywords.
Table D.3. Keywords for Threat 49
Text Rank
attack
adequate password policy
brute force attack
dictionary attacks
effective e
feasible
computationally
maximum length
password
password brute
possible passwords
possible value
proper enforcement
mechanism
pure brute force attack
rainbow tables
strong passwords
weak other password

Improved
password policy
password
policy
brute force
brute
force
combination
trial and error
trial
length
throttle
limit
strong password
strong
weak password
weak
user

Next, we investigated techniques to address the class imbalance in the data (Cohen et
al., 2006; Miwa et al., 2014; Timsina et al., 2016). The most obvious solution was to add more
relevant mitigations, so we extracted about a dozen additional documents relevant to threat 49
from the internet and added them to the data. In addition, we decided to try undersampling of
the dominant (NR) class. The danger of undersampling is information loss; however, due to the
extreme imbalance, it seemed a risk worth taking. We also decided to try oversampling of the
minority (R) class. Oversampling can result in overfitting, but this likewise seemed like a risk
worth taking in the given situation.
In trial 5, we created a dataset with one entry for each mitigation in the corpus, including
12 additional mitigations relevant to threat 49 drawn from the Internet. In this dataset, the
features consisted of threat 49 keyword counts plus the R/NR indicator. To reduce class
imbalance, we under-sampled by randomly dropping 2/3 of the NR instances, then we trained
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a SMO model. The training set contained about 225 instances (slight variances due to random
sampling) with about 9% relevant. Although still notable, the class imbalance was not as severe
as was the original dataset. In this trial, the SMO model showed improved precision (0.82) and
recall (0.67) of the R class, low false positives (0.00), and no appreciable impact to the precision
and recall of the NR class. We used several different methods for determining the keyword
counts, including a simple count of the times a keyword appeared in the document (TF), TFIDF,
TF divided by the total number of words in the document, and 0 or 1 to indicate the keyword is
present or absent in the document. Of these, the presence/absence approach yielded the best
results, which are reported here.

Trial 6
To further improve balance, in trial 6 we followed a process similar to trial 5, but with
100% Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) (He & Garcia, 2009; Liu et al.,
2016) based on 5 nearest neighbors to double the number of instances of the R class. The
SMOTE technique creates new instances of the minority class by drawing features from the K
(e.g. 5) nearest minority instances based on Euclidean distance in the feature space. We trained
a SMO model for threat 49. The training set contained about 225 instances, 18% relevant.
Although still significant, the class imbalance was less pronounced than the prior trial. With
combined undersampling of the NR class and oversampling of the R class, the SMO model
achieved precision of 0.97 and recall of 0.74 for the R class with minimal false positives and
no appreciable impact to the precision and recall of the NR class. The undersampling of the NR
class and oversampling of the R class showed some modest improvement in results over prior
trials, especially in regards to precision. However, a recall of 0.74 means we would fail to
recommend about a quarter of the available mitigations for threat 49.
We were curious about the potential impact of additional under- and oversampling, so
we experimented with 3/4 undersampling of the NR class, and 200% oversampling of the R
class for threat 49. When comparing 3/4 undersampling versus 2/3 undersampling of the NR
class for the same oversampling percentage (100%) of the R class, the precision, recall, and Fmeasure for 2/3 undersampling was better. When we increased oversampling of the NR class
to 200%, recall of the R class seemed to improve overall but with a small toll on precision. In
the 200% oversampling case, the model failed to properly classify test samples. These results
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suggest that 3/4 NR undersampling was too much and, when combined with 200% R
oversampling, the model was becoming overfit to the training data.

Ranked Retrieval
As a possible alternative to classification, in the spirit of iterative design, we
investigated two ranked retrieval (i.e. search engine) approaches to matching relevant
mitigations for a given threat similar to (Foltz, 1990; Goldrich et al., 2014; Swanson &
Smalheiser, 1997). In trials 7 and 8, we investigated ranking based on a combination of the
Boolean and Vector Space models as implemented in Apache Lucene (Apache Foundation,
2013). In trials 9 and 10, we investigated ranking based on Latent Semantic Analysis as
implemented in Gensim (Rehurek, 2018). The results are summarized in Table D.4 with details
provided after the table.
Table D.4. “Per Threat” Summary of Ranked Retrieval Iterations
#
7

8

9

Trial
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation
Features:
• Full mitigation text
• Tokenized, stop words
removed, TFIDF
Apache Lucene with Standard
analyzer similarity to threat
keywords (top 25)
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation
Features:
• Full mitigation text
• Tokenized, stop words
removed, TFIDF,
stemmed
Apache Lucene with Custom
analyzer similarity to threat
keywords (top 25)
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation
Features:

Class P@25 R
FP
R
0.48 0.48

F

C

I
12

13

R

0.60 0.60

15

10

R

0.92 0.92

23

2

84
#

10

Trial
• Full mitigation text
LSA similarity to full threat text
(top 25)
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation
Features:
• Full mitigation text
LSA similarity to threat name
(top 25)

Class P@25 R

R

FP

F

C

0.84 0.84

I

21

4

Trials 7 and 8
For trials 7 and 8, we used Apache Lucene, which implements the Vector Space models.
Retrieval in Lucene is a two-stage process. First, an index of the document corpus is created;
then queries can be run against the index. A Lucene index is an inverted index of terms in
documents, where each term consists of a field name and corresponding field token(s). The
tokens are, in essence, values of the fields input into the indexing process, except in the case of
text inputs they may have been tokenized, lower-cased, stemmed, etc. depending on the Lucene
Analyzer chosen. The inverted index supports scoring of results during the search stage such
that documents which contain more of the search terms will score higher and thus will be
deemed more relevant. Items designated as “TextField” are tokenized by the Analyzer which
those designated as “StringField” are captured literally in the index. We indexed the fields from
each mitigation as shown in Table D.5. Meanings of the fields are described in the Data Source
and One-time Data Preparation section above. We elected not to tokenize the Id and Threat Ids
because we included them in the index for diagnostic purposes only (not for searching) and we
wanted to preserve their human-readability. We elected not to tokenize the Domain of Attack
and Mechanism of Attack because these are metadata which we also wanted to preserve intact.
We allowed the remaining fields to be tokenized to improve matching during the search stage.
Table D.5. Fields Indexed for Ranked Retrieval
Field

Type

Index

Store

Rationale

Name

TextField

Yes

Yes

Threat matching

Description

TextField

Yes

No

Threat matching

Keywords

TextField

Yes

Yes

Threat matching
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Field

Type

Id

Index

Store

Rationale

StringField Yes

Yes

Diagnostic

Domain of Attack

StringField Yes

Yes

Threat matching

Mechanism of Attack

StringField Yes

Yes

Threat matching

Threat Ids Mitigated

StringField Yes

Yes

Diagnostic

We experimented with two different analyzers. The StandardAnalyzer is the most
commonly used Lucene analyzer. It tokenizes text based on white space, removes stop words,
and lower cases the text. We also tried a CustomAnalyzer, in which we added stemming to the
other options. We created the search query for each threat by or-ing its respective threat
keywords and executed the search over the mitigation text. The query returned the mitigations
in rank order by similarity. In a perfect world, the known relevant mitigations should be topranked, so we established a relevant/not relevant cutoff at the top 25 for purposes of measuring
the efficacy of this approach. At this cut-off, only about half the relevant mitigations were
returned, and precision and recall were about equivalent to a coin flip. If we were to use this
approach to recommend mitigations, we would not want the cut-off to be much larger than the
expected number of relevant results as this would lead to recommending mitigations that are
not actually relevant to the threat.

Trials 9 and 10
As mentioned in the Literature Review section, Latent Semantic Analysis has been
shown to improve retrieval of relevant documents from a corpus when compared to keyword
search because LSA addresses the issue of synonymy inherent in natural language. In trials 9
and 10 we experimented with a ranking approach using LSA. This is also a two-stage process
where the corpus must be indexed (i.e. transformed to a semantic space) before it can be queried.
We started with a comma-separated-values (CSV) file containing one row for each mitigation,
containing the mitigation id, text, and R/NR indicator designating the mitigation’s relevance to
threat 49. The mitigation text was used to build the semantic space and the other fields were
used for evaluation and diagnostic purposes.
For each mitigation text, stop words were removed, then the text was tokenized, lowercased, and stemmed. Using Gensim, Bag of words (BOW) and TFIDF representations of the
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corpus were computed and then TFIDF representation was transformed to a semantic space or
Latent Semantic Index (LSI) retaining 200 topics. This is slightly higher than the number of
standard threats in CAPEC and fits with optimal LSI dimensionality findings in (Bradford,
2008). Bradford observed favorable results when the number of topics was between 200 and
500 for a corpus with millions of documents. We selected the low end of Bradford’s range
because our corpus is much smaller than his. The LSI representation was saved for future use
in similarity queries. The BOW corpus had 637 documents and 1679 features.
We experimented with two approaches for constructing the threat query. In trial 9, we
used the full text of the threat document (tokenized, stemmed, lower-cased, and transformed to
the semantic space) as the query and in trial 10 we used the threat name (similarly transformed)
as the query. We established the cut-off at the top 25. In trial 9 (precision=0.92, recall=0.92),
22 of the known mitigations earned similarity scores in the top 25, while the others scored 26th,
38th, 40th, and 370th. In trial 10 (precision=0.84, recall=0.84), 21 of the known mitigations
ranked in the top 25 and all ranked in the top 82. Trial 9, similarity to full threat text,
outperformed trial 10, similarity to threat name. This suggests that a query with more semantic
context (i.e. more words) is better.
In terms of precision and recall, the LSA retrieval results are better than the SMO
models trained based on words in the mitigation text (trials 1 - 4) but slightly worse than the
SMO models trained to emphasize threat keywords in the mitigation text (trials 5 and 6). The
LSA results are better than the keyword search trials (7 and 8), which is not surprising given
LSA’s reputation for improved performance versus keyword search (Deerwester et al., 1990).

Hybrid
Drawing from (Manning et al., 2009), (Nakamoto, 2011), and (Gee, 2003), we
experimented with several hybrid approaches that combine ranked retrieval and classification
techniques. For these trials we used LSA features in conjunction with the SVM classifier. As
mentioned previously, we selected this classifier because support vector machines have been
shown to perform favorably for text classification, especially when the number of positive
instances per category is small (Platt, 1998). We decided to continue to use SVM in the hybrid
trials to facilitate apples-to-apples comparisons with the prior results. The results of these trials
are presented in Table D-6 with details following the table.
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Table D-6. “Per Threat” Summary of Hybrid Iterations
#
11

12

13

14

Trial
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation
Features:
• LSA transform of mitigation
text (200 features)
• R/NR indicator
Classifier: Weka SMO
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, drop rows not in top 100
similarity scores vs full threat text
Features:
• LSA transform of mitigation
text (200 features)
• R/NR indicator
(*)The number incorrect does not
include the one known relevant
mitigation that was ranked outside
the top 100.
Classifier: Weka SMO
Same as trial 12 except drop rows
not in top 100 similarity scores vs
threat name (all R samples were in
the top 100)
Classifier based on (Gee, 2003)
using LSA nearest neighbor and/or
majority on mitigation text

Class
R
NR

P
R
FP
F
C
I
1.00 0.72 0.00 0.76
18
7
0.99 1.00 0.28 0.99 612
0

R
NR

0.95 0.75 0.01
0.93 0.99 0.25

0.84
0.96

18
75

6(*)
1

R
NR

0.95 0.76 0.01
0.93 0.99 0.24

0.84
0.96

19
74

6
1

R

0.63 0.83 0.03

0.71

5

1

NR

0.99 0.97 0.17

0.98

92

1
(+2
tie)

Trials 11
In trial 11, we extracted the LSA-transformed representation of each mitigation (200
features) from the semantic space and made a CSV consisting of these features plus the R/NR
indicator. We trained a SMO model using this data set. The model in trial 11 achieves very high
precision (1.0) and minimal false positives but only mediocre recall (0.72). This suggests that,
although this approach would not recommend any errant mitigations, it would fail to
recommend nearly 40% of the relevant mitigations.
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Trials 12 - 13
Recalling that the dataset is extremely imbalanced in favor of the NR class and that we
saw improvement in the results above (trials 5 and 6) when we took steps to achieve better
balance in the training data, we decided, in trials 12 - 13, to utilize the LSA similarity scores as
a means to balance the training data. That is, we cut the training data off after the top 100 entries
based on similarity to the threat text. We intuited that this approach will be better than simply
undersampling at random and over-sampling with SMOTE for the following reasons.
Undersampling at random could drop relevant entries of which we already have too few.
Oversampling with SMOTE adds new instances to the corpus, but no new knowledge. Because
the similarity score imparts some knowledge about the semantics of the entries, keeping the
most similar entries will keep most of the relevant entries and in addition the non-relevant
entries that are most difficult to discriminate.
In trial 12, we used similarity scores resulting from comparing the full threat test against
the mitigations in the semantic space up to the cut-off. In trial 13, we used similarity scores
resulting from comparing the threat name against the mitigations up to the cut-off. In trials 12
and 13, we trained the models using only the 200 LSA features and the R/NR indicator. Trial
12 (similarity based on full threat text) and 13 (similarity based on threat name) produced
similar balance of precision and recall, while keeping false positives low (Trial 12: P=0.95,
R=0.75, FP=0.01; Trial 13: P=0.95, R=0.76, FP=0.01), but it is worth noting that the recall
number is somewhat optimistic because it does not account for one relevant mitigation that was
dropped from the training set because it ranked lower than the cut-off. We cannot afford to
omit up to 25% of the relevant mitigations.

Trial 14
In trial 14 we developed a method for classifying mitigations relevant/not-relevant to a
given threat inspired by Gee (Gee, 2003) and Foltz (Foltz, 1990). First, LSA was utilized to
create a semantic space for a training set consisting of 80% of the existing labeled mitigation
documents and an external index was constructed to maintain the known relevance status of the
mitigation with regard to the threat. When a new mitigation document was presented, it was
used as a query against the semantic space, returning a ranked list of other mitigation documents
similar to the query from most similar to least. The trial 14 classifier classifies the new
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document in three stages. First, it is classified according to the class of its nearest neighbor in
the space (i.e. the existing mitigation document whose similarity score is highest). Next, the
new mitigation document is classified according to class of the majority of all results in the
ranked list truncated at an arbitrary cut-off N. Finally, if the majority and nearest neighbor
stages agree, the new mitigation document is deemed to be of the nearest neighbor’s class. If
the majority and nearest neighbor stages do not agree, the dispute is settled by the third stage
which attempts to detect the skew of the new document towards one class or the other. We
implemented the first 2 stages using an arbitrary cut-off of top 5, but for the tie-breaker we took
a default where tie equates to an incorrect classification (i.e. for the R class, resulting prediction
is NR; for the NR class, resulting prediction is R). We intended to go back and implement a
more robust tie-breaker if observations revealed an approach that would be beneficial.
In trial 14, there were 546 mitigations in the training set and 101 (6 relevant and 95 not
relevant to threat 49) in the testing set. On the test data, this method yielded precision of 0.63
and recall of 0.83 with 3% false positives on the R class and 0.99/0.97/17% for the NR class.
Two ties were encountered in the NR class indicating the need to consider a better tie-breaker
before this method could to be viable.
A possible stage 3 algorithm, based on (Gee, 2003) is as follows for arbitrary A, B, and
C which Gee set to 0.7, 0.7, and 0.65 respectively:
•
•
•
•
•

If the average of the majority scores > A and the nearest neighbor score < B, use the
majority class
If the average of the majority scores < B and the nearest neighbor score > A use the
nearest neighbor class
If the nearest neighbor score > C use the nearest neighbor class
If the average of the majority scores > C use the majority class
If still not determined, result = incorrect classification

Analysis of Text
Success in classifying textual data is heavily influenced by the characteristics of the text
itself. Having experimented with a few variations, it made sense to pause and look closely at
the text of threat 49 for insights on the matching successes and failures. In the training corpus,
there are 25 known relevant mitigations. Using diagnostic tools, we identified 6 mitigations that
were commonly misclassified in the trials. One thing the false negative instances had in
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common is that they lack any text that helps the reader understand how the mitigation addresses
the threat. The false positives fell into two categories: (a) some dealt with password
vulnerabilities but not specifically password brute force guessing and (b) others dealt with brute
force guessing but not of passwords. We hypothesized that improving the mitigation texts to
include an explanation of how each one addresses the threat would improve the match results
by reducing the FNs. In some applications of text mining, the text “is what it is” and we have
to use what we find (e.g. ratings, surveys, news articles). For threat-mitigation matching, we
have influence over the problem space and thus we do have the luxury of recommending
improvements to the threat and mitigation documents to better support automated matching in
the future. With that in mind, we augmented the text of the FPs and FNs then reran selected
trials as shown in Table D-7 and described below the table. A side-by-side comparison of the
results for the R class on the original and improved mitigation text for the best trials is provided
in Table D-8.
Table D-7. “Per Threat” Summary (Improved Mitigation Text)
#
15

16

17

18

18b
18c

Trial
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, enhanced mitigation text
with vector space representation and
TFIDF
(comparable to trial 3)
Same as trial 15 plus attribute
selection: top 200 attributes based on
information gain
(comparable to trial 4)
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, full corpus, 200 LSA
features from enhanced mitigation
text
(comparable to trial 11)
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, 200 LSA features from
enhanced mitigation text, drop rows
not in top 100 (comparable to trial
12), Weka SMO
Same as trial 18 but retain top 200
rows
Same as trial 18 but retain top 300
rows

Class
R
NR

P
R
FP
F
C
I
1.00 0.56 0.00 0.72 14
11
0.98 1.00 0.44 0.99 612
0

R
NR

1.00 0.56 0.00
0.98 1.00 0.44

0.72 14
0.99 612

R

0.95 0.80 0.00

0.87

20

5

NR

0.99 0.99 0.20

0.99 611

1

R
NR

0.95 0.80 0.01
0.94 0.99 0.20

0.87
0.96

20
74

5
1

R
NR
R
NR

1.00
0.97
0.94
0.97

0.82 14
0.98 180
0.76 16
0.98 274

6
0
9
1

0.70
1.00
0.64
0.99

0.00
0.30
0.00
0.36

11
0
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#
18d

19

Trial
Same as trial 18 except using scikitlearn SVM.SVC

Class
R

P
R
FP
F
C
I
0.96 0.92 0.01 0.94 23
2

NR

0.97 0.99 0.08

0.98

74

1

Classifier based on (Gee, 2003) using R
LSA nearest neighbor and/or
NR
majority on enhanced mitigation text
(comparable to trial 14)

0.75 1.00 0.01

0.86

6

0

1.00 0.99 0.00

0.99 200

2

Trials 15 - 16
We ran trials 15 and 16 to see if the improved mitigation text yielded improved results when
classifying the text using the Vector Space Model and TFIDF weights without and with
information gain attribute selection. These compare with trials 3 and 4 in Table 3. We saw
improvement in recall and precision and reduction in both false negatives and false positives,
but recall was still too low for our purposes.

Trials 17 - 18
We ran trials 17 - 18 on the improved text because the corresponding trials in Table 4 showed
the best results on the original text. In trial 17, we trained the classifier on the LSA features
using the full corpus. In trial 18, we used the top 100 mitigations ranked by similarity to the
threat as the training corpus. Trial 17 showed modest improvement in recall but a slight decline
in precision over a similar trial (11) and no false positives. Trial 18 showed stable precision and
false positive rate and modest improvement in recall over a similar trial (12). This model has
good precision and an acceptably low FP rate on the R class, but the recall of 0.80 was
concerning because it represents a significant number of relevant mitigations that would not be
recommended. We ran alternate versions of trial 18 where we retained the 200 (18b) and 300
(18c) top-ranked mitigations, but the recall of the R class declined as we increased the training
dataset, likely because the additional samples were mainly NR samples resulting in increased
class imbalance. An alternate version (18d) using scikit-learn SVM.SVC had a modest
improvement in precision over the Weka SMO version (18) and a notable improvement in
recall.
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Trial 19
In trial 19, overall precision and recall for the R class was 0.75/1.0 with 1% FP and for the NR
class was 1.0/0.99 with no false positives. For the NR class, in 200 instances, the predicted and
actual labels agreed, 2 resulted in a tie (reaffirming the need to more fully investigate a tiebreaker) where nearest neighbor class predicted NR but top 5 majority predicted R, and none
were incorrectly classified. The nearest neighbor similarity range for the R class was 0.47 to
0.92 and for the NR class was 0.36 to 1. The majority mean similarity range for the R class was
0.45 to 0.65 and for the NR class was 0.31 to 0.89. With such large ranges, tie-breaker cut-offs
similar to those in Gee’s algorithm were not obvious. The majority and nearest neighbor
similarities for the two ties, both of the NR class, were 0.41 and 0.38 respectively.
Table D-8. “Per Threat” Results Before and After Text Improvement
#
3
15

Trial
Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, mitigation text with
vector space representation and
TFIDF

Class P
R
FP
F
C
I
R
0.92 0.48 0.00 0.63
12
13
R
1.00 0.56 0.00 0.72
14
11

4
16

Same as trial 3/15 plus attribute
selection: top 200 attributes based
on information gain

R
R

0.83
1.00

0.39 0.002 0.53
0.56 0.00 0.72

5
14

8
11

6

Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, 2/3 undersampling of
the NR class instances and 100%
SMOTE oversampling of the R
class, presence/absence of threat
keywords in mitigation text
(Note: No after improvement trial)

R

0.97

0.74

0.00 0.84

31

1

11
17

Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, full corpus with 200
LSA features

R
R

1.00
0.95

0.72
0.80

0.00 0.76
0.00 0.87

18
20

7
5

12

R

0.95

0.75

0.01 0.84

18

18d

Threat 49, one row for each
mitigation, drop rows not in top
100, 200 LSA features

R

0.96

0.92

0.01 0.94

14
19

Ensemble classifier based on (Gee,
2003)

R
R

0.63
0.75

0.83
1.00

0.03 0.71
0.01 0.86

6+
1(*)
23
2
5
6

1
0
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Table D-8 provides a comparison of results for “per threat” matching approaches for
selected trials before and after improvement of the mitigation text. Per common practice, we
used the precision, recall, and false positive rates of the R class (based on cross-validation
statistics generated during training) to compare the models. From these results, we decided to
advance the designs in trials 12/18d and 14/19. These have the best balance of precision and
recall on cross-validated training data. We left the designs in trials 3/15, 4/16, and 11/17 behind
due to unacceptably low recall. We shelved the design in trial 6 for two reasons. First, its recall
lags behind the other retained designs. Second, the automated keyword/phrase extraction was
only moderately successful, leaving us with required manual SME intervention to perfect the
keywords. Note also that our intuition that improving the mitigation text to describe how the
mitigation addresses the threat would yield better matching results is buoyed by these initial
results, especially in regards to precision.

Extensibility to Other Threats
Having seen promising results from some “per threat” designs, we wanted to know if
these results would extend to other CAPEC standard threats. Tables D-9, D-10, D-11, and D12 show results for threats 268, 593, 66, and 134 respectively for the designs in trials 13/14 for
the unimproved text and 18d/19 for the improved text.
Table D-9. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 268
#
13

14

18d

19

Trial
Unimproved Text
One row for each mitigation, drop
rows not in top 100, 200 LSA
features (*) The number incorrect
does not include the one known
relevant mitigation that was ranked
outside the top 100
Ensemble classifier based on (Gee,
2003)
Improved Text
One row for each mitigation, 200
LSA features, drop rows not in top
100
Ensemble classifier based on (Gee,
2003)

Class P

R

FP

F

C

I

R

1.00

0.90

0.00 0.95

NR

0.98

1.00

0.00 0.99

2+
1(*)
80
0

R
NR

0.66
0.96

0.50
0.98

0.02 0.57
0.50 0.97

2
49

2
1

R
NR

0.95
0.99

0.95
0.99

0.01 0.95
0.05 0.99

20
78

1
1

R
NR

0.80
1.00

1.00
0.98

0.02 0.89
0.00 0.99

4
49

0
1

18

94

Table D-10. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 593
#
13

14

18d

19

Trial
Unimproved Text
One row for each mitigation, 200
LSA features, drop rows not in top
100
Ensemble classifier based on (Gee,
2003)

Improved Text
One row for each mitigation, 200
LSA features, drop rows not in top
100
Ensemble classifier based on (Gee,
2003)

Class P

R

FP

F

R

0.73

0.69

0.12 0.71

NR
R
NR

0.86
0.30
0.99

0.88
0.75
0.96

0.31 0.87
0.04 0.75
0.25 0.99

R

0.94

0.86

0.03 0.90

NR
R
NR

0.93
0.45
1.00

0.97
1.00
0.97

0.14 0.95
0.03 0.91
0.00 0.99

C

I
22

10+
4(*)
60
8
3
1
167
1
(+6
tie)
30

5+
1(*)
63
2
5
0
167
1
(+5
tie)

Table D-11. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 66
#
13

14

18d

19

Trial
Unimproved Text
One row for each mitigation, 200
LSA features, drop rows not in top
100
Ensemble classifier based on
(Gee, 2003)

Improved Text
One row for each mitigation, 200
LSA features, drop rows not in top
100
Ensemble classifier based on
(Gee, 2003)

Class P

R

FP

F

C

I

R

0.50

0.33

0.06 0.40

NR
R

0.89
0.00

0.94
0.00

0.67 0.91
0.03 0.00

NR

0.96

0.97

1.00 0.98

R
NR

0.86
0.97

0.90
0.96

0.04 0.88
0.10 0.97

18
77

2
3

R
NR

0.80
1.00

1.00
0.99

0.01 1.00
0.00 1.00

4
98

0
(+1
tie)

5

10+
5(*)
80
5
0 3 (+1
tie)
96 1 (+2
tie)
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Table D-12. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 134
#
13

14

18d

19

Trial
Unimproved Text
One row for each mitigation, 200
LSA features, drop rows not in top
100
Ensemble classifier based on (Gee,
2003)

Improved Text
One row for each mitigation, 200
LSA features, drop rows not in top
100
Ensemble classifier based on (Gee,
2003)

Class P

R

FP

F

C

I

R
NR

0.86
0.98

0.75
0.99

0.01 0.80
0.25 0.98

6
91

2
1

R

0.00

0.00

0.00 0.00

0

NR

0.98

1.00

1.00 1.00

111

1
(+1
tie)
0

R
NR

1.00
0.99

0.88
1.00

0.00 0.93
0.13 0.99

7
92

1
0

R

1.00

0.50

0.00 1.00

1

NR

0.99

1.00

0.50 1.00

111

0
(+1
tie)
0

Table D-13 shows a summary of the cross-validation statistics for the R class for models
trained for threats 49, 66, 134, 268, and 593. Note that precision, recall, and false positive rates
are better for the improved text when compared to models trained with the unimproved text. Of
the two, the SVM classifier based on LSA features and top 100 most similar documents (Trial
18d) has the best precision, recall, and false positive rate when compared to the ensemble
classifier (19).
Table D-13. “Per Threat” Models Summary for R Class
#

13

14

Trial
Unimproved Text
One row for each
mitigation, 200 LSA
features, drop rows not in
top 100

Ensemble classifier based
on (Gee, 2003)

Threat

P
(Mean)

R
(Mean)

FP
(Mean)

134
49
268
593
66

0.86
0.95
1.00
0.73
0.50
(0.81)
0.00
0.63
0.66
0.30
0.00
(0.32)

0.75
0.76
0.90
0.69
0.33
(0.69)
0.00
0.83
0.50
0.75
0.00
(0.42)

0.01
0.01
0.00
0.11
0.06
(0.04)
0.00
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.03
(0.02)

134
49
268
593
66

#C

#I

6
19
18
22
5
(64%)
0
5
2
3
0
(53%)

2
6
3
14
15
(36%)
1
1
2
1
4
(47%)

96
#

18
d

19

Trial
Improved Text
One row for each
mitigation, 200 LSA
features, drop rows not in
top 100

Ensemble classifier based
on (Gee, 2003)

Threat

P
(Mean)

R
(Mean)

FP
(Mean)

134
49
268
593
66

1.00
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.86
(0.94)
1.00
0.75
0.80
0.45
0.80
(0.76)

0.88
0.92
0.95
0.86
0.90
(0.90)
0.50
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
(0.90)

0.00
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.04
(0.02)
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.01
(0.01)

134
49
268
593
66

#C

#I

7
23
20
30
18
(89%)
1
6
4
5
4
(95%)

1
2
1
6
2
(11%)
1
0
0
0
0
(5%)

“One for All” - Beyond the Per Threat Approach
So far, we have discussed matching approaches that are implemented on a “per threat” basis.
This approach is derived from the medical SRs research discussed in the Literature Review. It
is based on the premise that each threat has its own pattern or semantics. A “per threat” solution
is not unreasonable and would work for our purposes as described in the Architecture section.
However, we wondered if there was a way to implement a “one for all” approach where a single
matcher would determine relevant mitigations for any threat contained in the corpus. In the next
paragraphs, we discuss two trials towards a “one for all” approach as summarized in Table D14. We used the unimproved text for these trials because it was not practical to improve the text
of the entire CAPEC dataset.
Table D-14. “One for All” Trials
#
20

Trial
All threat-mitigation
combinations, up to 200 LSA
features of each, unimproved text,
Weka SMO

Class P
R
FP
F
C
I
R
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0 593
NR
0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 86915
0

21

Ensemble classifier based on
(Gee, 2003)

R

3

8
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Trial 20
In Trial 20, we used LSA to create a semantic space representing all the standard threats
and a separate semantic space representing all the labeled mitigations for these threats. Then
for each combination of a threat and a mitigation, we made a training dataset consisting of the
200 LSA factors representing the mitigation from the corresponding semantic space, the threat
id, 163 LSA factors representing the threat from the corresponding semantic space, and a label
indicating whether the mitigation was relevant or not relevant to the threat. (Although we
specified 200 features when building both semantic spaces, the threat space yielded only 163
features.) The dataset consisted of 364 attributes and 87,000 instances. We trained a SMO
model which we hoped might be able to answer for given threat (T) and mitigation (M), is M
relevant to T? The results shown in Table 14 indicate that this model will not be able to
distinguish relevant T-M pairs from non-relevant ones. Intuitively, this result makes sense. It is
simply a hodge-podge of features tagged either R or NR. When the threat features and the
mitigation features are comingled, the model does not know which features represent the threat
and which represent the mitigation. Also, there is no reason to expect that, for example, a
relevant T-M pair for Threat 49 will have anything in common with a relevant T-M pair for
Threat 268 to indicate that they are both of class R since they express totally different concepts.

Trial 21
In Trial 21, we constructed a model based on (Gee, 2003)6 to try to select the threat T
to which a new mitigation M is relevant from among all threats in the corpus based on M’s
similarity to labeled mitigations already known to be relevant to T. We used LSA to create a
semantic space of the mitigations mapped to all the standard threats in the corpus and we also
created an index of which mitigations are labeled relevant to each threat. In this classifier threat
id is the dependent variable. When a new mitigation document is presented, it is used as a query
against the semantic space, returning a ranked list of other mitigation documents similar to the
query from most similar to least. The trial 21 model classifies the new document in three stages.
First, it is classified according to the class of its nearest neighbor in the space (i.e. it is assigned
the threat id associated with the existing mitigation document whose similarity score is highest).

6

Note this model is not the same as the one discussed in the “per threat” section, trials 14 and 19.
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Next, the new mitigation document is classified according to the class (threat id) associated
with of the majority of all mitigations in the ranked list truncated at an arbitrary cut-off N.
Finally, if the majority and nearest neighbor stages agree, the new mitigation document is
deemed to be relevant to the threat to which its nearest neighbor is relevant. If the majority and
nearest neighbor stages do not agree, the dispute is settled by the third stage which attempts to
detect the skew of the new document towards one class or the other. We implemented the first
two stages (but not the tie-breaker) and tested the results with 11 representative mitigations. Of
these, the model classified 3 mitigations as relevant to the correct threat, 7 to an incorrect threat,
and 1 resulted in a tie, which we count as incorrect in the absence of tie-breaker logic. These
results were so poor that we did not invest any time in developing a tie-breaker, since it would
only come into play a small percentage of the time. This result was more of a brain teaser than
the prior trial, but in the final analysis it also made intuitive sense. Given a threat, for example,
breach of physical access, we may have mitigations that describe a fence, a wall, a moat, and
drone surveillance and each of these mitigations will furthermore describe how they mitigate
the threat. If we present a new mitigation, for example, an armed guard, which also describes
how it mitigates the threat, the mitigation itself (armed guard) is not very similar to any of the
other mitigations (fence, wall, moat, drone) for the threat. Even though all the listed mitigations
may present as similar to the threat, the inverse is not necessarily true.
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APPENDIX E: CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT
A number of cyber risk assessment methodologies are described in the literature and in
use today. These include:
•

Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute Operationally Critical Threat, Asset,
and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Caralli et al., 2007)

•

ISACA Risk IT Framework based on Control Objectives for Information and Related
Technologies (COBIT) (ISACA, 2009; Schmittling, 2010)

•

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Mission Information Risk
Analysis (MIRA) (Llanso et al., 2012) (Llanso et al., 2013)

•

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory BluGen (Llanso et al., 2017)

•

Mitre Crown Jewels Analysis (CJA) and Threat Assessment and Remediation
Methodology (TARA) (MITRE, 2015)

•

US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-30:
Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments (National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2012)

•

Automated Risk and Utility Management (AURUM) (Fenz et al., 2011)
These were selected because they are representative of approaches in use by

organizations that employ formal cyber risk assessment processes and because descriptions are
available in open literature. Note that this is not an exhaustive survey of such methodologies,
and in particular does not include proprietary and other closed-source methodologies.
OCTAVE is an eight-step process, as follows. First, impact areas (e.g. financial,
productivity, reputation, health, etc.) are identified and ranked. Next critical information assets
are identified as well as IT and non-IT locations where critical information is processed and
stored. Then situations that could affect the critical information are enumerated and threat
scenarios (including asset, actor, access, motive, and outcome) are identified. The consequences
of identified threat scenarios are assessed to point out risks. An aggregate score is derived for
each identified threat/consequence by assigning qualitative impact values (e.g. high, medium,
low) to each identified threat/consequence for each impact area, multiplying by the rank of the
impact area, and summing the products. Finally, a relative risk matrix is developed based on
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probability of occurrence (high, medium, low) and score ranges, then mitigation approaches are
selected based on the risk matrix.
Similarly, Risk IT, advocates identifying risk scenarios derived from understanding of
business objectives, where each scenario considers the potential actor (insider, competitor, etc.),
threat type (malicious, accidental, etc.), event type, asset or resource affected, and time.
Likewise, CJA+TARA considers mission priorities and potential impacts due to cyber,
identifying the potential threats faced by each individual asset based on common attack patterns
cataloged in CAPEC (MITRE, 2017a), scoring (on a scale of 1-5) each threat in multiple
dimensions, and aggregating to produce a risk score per asset. Additionally, the NIST risk
assessment process is a 5-step process, including: (1) identify possible threat sources and
events, (2) identify inherent vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions present in the system,
(3) determine likelihood of occurrence of events, (4) determine magnitude of impact of each
event occurrence, and (5) determine risk as a combination of likelihood of occurrence and
impact. The AURUM Framework follows the NIST risk assessment process and also includes
automated control recommendations.
In MIRA, two sets of risk scores are expert-generated. First, experts judge mission
impact for each viable combination of mission, system asset, data type, and cyber effect
(confidentiality, integrity, or availability). Also, expert input for adversary level of effort
(LOE), the amount of effort and/or resources an adversary would have to apply to realize the
effect, is required for each viable combination of asset, data type, cyber effect and attack vector.
Risk is then visualized by plotting the mission contexts on an x-y plot such that those with the
highest mission impact (x) and lowest LOE (y) are the highest priority candidates for mitigation.
BluGen takes a capability-centric approach based on an expert-constructed reusable
knowledge resource called the Reference Catalog. In this catalog, threats are mapped to asset
types in a taxonomy and mitigations are mapped to threats. Consistent with event-centric
approaches, like MIRA, OCTAVE, CJA, Risk IT, and AURUM, BluGen intakes a description
of the system being assessed, including assets, data types, and mitigations already present.
BluGen requires a set of raw criticality scores, one for each viable combination of mission,
asset, data type, and cyber effect. BluGen estimates risk from these scores and the threat-asset
type mappings. To the extent that threat-mitigation mappings exist in the Reference Catalog,
BluGen is the only method discussed here that recommends mitigations; however, the catalog
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is still in its infancy. Ongoing construction of the BluGen Reference Catalog could benefit from
an automated approach to mapping mitigations to threats. Table E.1 summarizes the risk
assessment methods discussed above.
Table E.1. Asset-based, Threat-informed Cyber Risk Assessment Methods

Method
AURUM

Characterize

Characterize

Characterize

Assess

System

Mission

Threat

Risk

Assets

Magnitude of

Threat sources

Aggregation of

impact of

and events;

combined

adverse events

inherent

likelihood of

(Fenz et al., 2011)

vulnerabilities; occurrence and
likelihood of

impact

occurrence
BluGen

Assets, data,

Mission

Adversary’s

Asset exposure

(Llanso et al.,

existing

weights,

anticipated

based on existing

2017)

mitigations

criticality

offensive

mitigations and

scores per

capabilities

Reference Catalog

mission/asset/

mappings, asset

data/cyber

criticality based

effect

on aggregation of
individual
criticality scores

CJA+TARA
(MITRE, 2015)

Assets

Mission

Potential

Aggregation of

priorities

threats by

scores

asset, scored
based on
common
attack patterns
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Characterize

Characterize

Characterize

Assess

System

Mission

Threat

Risk

MIRA

Assets, data,

Mission impact

Adverse

x-y plot of assets

(Llanso et al.,

connectivity

per asset/data/

events scored

by mission impact

cyber effect

by required

and LOE

Method

2012, 2013)

adversary LOE
per asset/data/
cyber
effect/attack
vector
NIST SP 800-30

Assets

Magnitude of

Threat sources

Aggregation of

(National Institute

impact of

and events;

combined

of Standards and

adverse events

inherent

likelihood of

Technology,

vulnerabilities; occurrence and

2012)

likelihood of

impact

occurrence
OCTAVE

Assets,

Areas of

Threat

Aggregation of

(Caralli et al.,

locations,

impact,

scenarios

scores for each

2007)

information

consequences

(asset, actor,

identified threat/

access, motive, consequence
and outcome)
Business

Threat

Aggregation of

objectives

scenarios

magnitude of

Schmittling,

(asset, actor,

impact

2010)

motive, time),

RISKIT
(ISACA, 2009;

Assets

frequency and
magnitude of
impact of
occurrences
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APPENDIX F: MITIGATION OPTIMIZATION APPROACHES
The CSE faces two main problems when selecting a security control portfolio to address
an organization’s cyber risk. First, there may be multiple conflicting objectives to be considered
(e.g. cost, ease of use) making it impossible to arrive at a single optimal solution. At the same
time, the number of combinations of viable alternatives presents an overwhelmingly large
search space, requiring strategies to winnow it down to a tractable scope. These decisions are
complex and inexact, involve multiple stakeholders with diverse interests, and require tradeoffs between conflicting objectives. Moreover, information environments, risk tolerance levels,
and the threats they face vary widely from one organization to the next. (Kiesling et al., 2016)
Hence, compromise solutions must be sought. There is a large body of research which applies
multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) techniques to solve the mitigation optimization
problem. In addition, a few authors have applied game theory to the problem. We discuss these
below and summarize them in Table F-1.

Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Approaches
Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM), also known as multiple-criteria decision
analysis (MCDA), is widely applied to security portfolio selection (Fenz et al., 2011; Llansó et
al., 2019; Patterson et al., 2013; Sawik, 2013; Schilling & Werners, 2016; Weishäupl, 2017;
Yevseyeva et al., 2015). MCDM is discipline for evaluating multiple conflicting criteria. It is
used to analyze problems where these are some measures of costs and benefits which can be
traded off to arrive at the best solution under the given constraints. Researchers investigate a
number of MCDM techniques for this problem, some of which include or are based on fuzzy
set theory (Otero, 2014), multi-attribute utility theory (i.e. value functions, knapsack strategy)
(Fielder et al., 2016; Panaousis et al., 2014; Shapasand et al., 2015; Smeraldi & Malacaria,
2014), evolutionary multi-objective optimization (EMO) also known as genetic algorithms
(Gupta et al., 2006; Kiesling et al., 2016, 2012; Rees et al., 2011; Sarala et al., 2016; Viduto et
al., 2012), analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010), grey relational analysis
(GRA) (Breier & Hudec, 2013), simple additive weighting (SAW) (Llanso, 2012; Llansó et al.,
2019), the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) (Breier &
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Hudec, 2013), and preference ranking organization method for enrichment evaluation
(PROMETHEE) (Lv et al., 2011).
(Fenz et al., 2011) describe an automated approach to mitigation selection that requires
as input an enumeration of relevant potential controls, risk level of the protected asset, and
control attributes, such as cost and effectiveness. Their method defines mitigation selection in
terms of a multi-objective combinatorial optimization problem which seeks to select controls
by analyzing alternatives in consideration of the stakeholder’s objectives, such as risk reduction,
cost, availability, and reliability to choose Pareto-efficient combinations. They provide a user
interface where each objective is represented by a slider, allowing the stakeholder to tune the
upper and lower bounds of his objectives and obtain immediate feedback.
(Patterson et al., 2013) describe a method for optimizing security control decisions for
critical infrastructure systems. Given a fixed budget, the method balances costs and benefits of
improving three dimensions of cybersecurity, intrusion prevention, detection, and response by
posing the selection as an optimization problem. The goal of the optimization is to select the
investment strategy that yields the smallest residual probability of successful attack, i.e. the best
security portfolio for the budget. This optimization problem requires models of the system
under analysis, cost and performance of applicable security controls, and risk. The authors note
that creating the models presents a large challenge for future work.
Given an enumeration of threats and potential mitigations, (Sawik, 2013) describes a biobjective mixed integer trade-off model to select an optimal countermeasure portfolio
balancing expected and worst-case losses. The model applies conditional value-at-risk (CVaR)
and scenario-based analysis to select controls by considering desired confidence, expected loss,
budget, and risk tolerance.
(Schilling & Werners, 2016) present a combinatorial optimization model for optimal
selection of security controls. Unlike most models, which are based on cost minimization, this
model minimizes the number of controls as a proxy for cost. The authors decided to do this
because it eliminates the need to collect cost data on all the candidate solutions before selecting
a solution. Their idea is to cost out the selected solution and if the cost is too high, rerun the
model after reducing the number of controls.
(Weishäupl, 2017) describe a multi-objective optimization model for control selection
which seeks to minimize control cost while maximizing security level. Overall security level is
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computed as the sum of the security levels of individual assets weighted by importance. Each
asset’s security level is inversely proportional to the severities of the vulnerabilities by which
it is affected accounting for probability of occurrence. Cost is the sum of initial costs (e.g.
purchase, set-up), operating costs (e.g. annual fees and ongoing maintenance), and costs
associated with security breaches (e.g. disruption of business, damage, reputation, decline in
stock price).
(Yevseyeva et al., 2015) present two formulations of security control selection based on
quadratic integer programming based on a traditional risk vs return model common in financial
portfolio selection. A multi-objective formula seeks to minimize risk (based on probability of
successful attack) and maximize return (by minimizing expected losses due to cyber breach)
while simultaneously satisfying a budget constraint. A single-objective formula is derived from
the multi-objective formula by assuming that both the return and the budget are constrained.
(Yevseyeva, Fernandes, Van Moorsel, Janicke, & Emmerich, 2016) seek to apply the
Sharpe ratio common in financial analysis to security control selection based on a fixed budget
and two objectives, risk and return. Maximizing the Sharpe ratio supports computation of
efficient portfolios while balancing the objectives in an optimal way.
In his doctoral dissertation, (Otero, 2014) describes creation of an artifact based on
fuzzy set theory and constructed using the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox. Taking four input
variables for each security control under consideration - estimated implementation cost, scope
(number of assets protected), extent of compliance with laws and regulations, and effectiveness
in addressing the risks - Otero’s artifact includes fuzzy “if-then” rules and membership
functions defining objectives and constraints developed in consultation with cybersecurity
experts and based on the literature. Execution of the rules results in a set of selected controls.
The design of the rules and functions in the artifact is based on expert responses to a survey that
asks experts to identify the existing controls in place in their organization, rank the 11 ISO/IEC
2702 information security areas by order of importance to the organization, rate the detailed list
of security controls in their top three security areas on cost, scope, compliance, and
effectiveness.
(Panaousis et al., 2014) model the cybersecurity posture of an organization and then
present a series of non-cooperative control-games where each game is between the defender (a
single control) and the attacker. The Nash Equilibria of the games is derived in consideration
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of organizational preferences such as costs, anticipated threats, and asset importance. A multiobjective, multi-choice knapsack approach is then used to optimize investment in controls
within the organization’s budget.
(Shapasand et al., 2015) apply a knapsack model for control selection with budget as
the constraint. Consts considered in this model include cost of maintaining desired levels of
C/I/A, profit reduction due to C/I/A compromise, and penalty cost (e.g. fines, reputation) due
to C/I/A compromise. (Smeraldi & Malacaria, 2014) describe a combinatoric optimization
algorithm based on variations of the knapsack problem that can also account for mitigations
that benefit more than one asset and mitigations that, when applied together, provide more
benefit than the sum of their individual benefits.
(Kiesling et al., 2012) describe a decision support framework for security control
selection consisting of three stages. In the modeling stage assets, threats, and available controls
are identified. In the second stage, a baseline risk assessment is determined through simulation.
Finally, Pareto-efficient control portfolios are computed via multi-objective optimization.
(Kiesling et al., 2016) describe Multi-Objective decision Support in Efficient Security
Safeguard Selection (MOSES3), a collaborative decision support process that enables
cybersecurity professionals and strategic decision makers to “bridge the gap between strategic
security investment and operational implementation decisions.” After describing the system
architecture (assets, data, access), identifying threats and attacker skill level, and enumerating
existing controls, assets are valued according to their criticality by C/I/A and candidate
mitigations per asset and are specified. An attack-based simulation seeks to estimate a set of
Pareto-efficient security control portfolios, optimizing via a genetic algorithm while
minimizing the specified objectives (cost, C/I/A impact, undetected rate, target reached rate).
Each portfolio is evaluated by initializing the system model with the given set of controls then
simulating attacks and aggregating attack outcomes.
(Gupta et al., 2006) present a genetic algorithm approach for selecting a security profile
that minimizes cost while also minimizing the number of unmitigated vulnerabilities. (Rees et
al., 2011) present a decision support system which uses a genetic algorithm to determine an
optimal combination of countermeasures by trading off cost versus residual risk where risk is
calculated as the sum for all anticipated threats of the number of occurrences expected annually
and the expected cost of each occurrence.
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(Sarala et al., 2016) describe an approach to optimizing control selection where
solutions must observe a budgetary constraint and solution cost must not exceed the anticipated
losses if threats were left unmitigated. Their approach solves a multi-objective problem by
applying TABU search combined with genetic algorithm. The objectives, to maximize the
number of vulnerabilities addressed while minimizing the cost of the solution, are first
processed via the TABU search to arrive at a set of Pareto-efficient solutions. These serve as
the initial input to a genetic algorithm
(Viduto et al., 2012) apply the evolutionary algorithm known as Multi-Objective Tabu
Search (MOTS) for selecting security controls as a multi-objective optimization problem
balancing financial costs (purchase, operational, training, and labor) and residual risk. The
MOTS algorithm was shown to arrive at a Pareto-efficient set more rapidly than the exhaustive
search method with similar quality solutions.
(El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010) describe a collaborative multi-perspective decision support
system (DSS) based on AHP and stakeholder input. The decision model is comprised of assets,
threats, and controls expressed as a set of vectors and analysis subspaces representing the
pairwise interactions, e.g. threat-asset, threat-control, and asset-control. Stakeholders may be
assigned unequal weights. They express judgments of the pairwise interactions. Judgments are
aggregated using the weighted arithmetic mean to provide a ranked list in order of importance.
(Breier & Hudec, 2013) describe a quantitative prioritization of security controls based
on asset valuation and the threats identified by an a priori risk assessment. Their method uses
GRA combined with the TOPSIS, taking as inputs asset importance (financial values), threat
data (impact, to which assets, probability of occurrence), and potential security controls
(purchase price, difficulty of implementation, maintenance cost, efficiency, applicable to which
threats). The security control alternatives are evaluated based on cost, efficiency, and protection
against the most significant threats and the top n are selected.
Cyber Investment Analysis Methodology (CIAM) (Llanso, 2012) combines data about
the infrastructure to be protected (key hardware, software, people, and processes), incident data
(vulnerabilities, attack steps, and frequency) related to the infrastructure, potential security
controls including cost to install and maintain, possible business impacts of cyber events, and
control weightings (effectiveness) to compute an initial selection of security controls and
investment prioritization. A SAW algorithm combines the incident data, effectiveness scores,
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control costs, and impact data to compute a list of controls in relative priority order. The list
can be used to select controls in the content to an overall cyber security budget.
(Lv et al., 2011) describe a multi-criteria ranking model based on PROMETHEE
method. Its accepts a finite set of security controls and a set of evaluation criteria (e.g. purchase
cost, operating/maintenance cost, effectiveness, alignment with standards) as inputs, then ranks
security controls quantitatively. Evaluation criteria must be numeric, but they can have various
units and some may be minimized while others are maximized in order to identify a set of
controls that optimizes all the criteria.
(Llansó et al., 2019) describe a SAW-based mitigation selection approach that uses a
set of weighted criteria and a a capability-based representation for cybersecurity mitigations.
The security engineer sets the weights based on organizational priorities and constraints and the
algorithm recommends a candidate set of mitigations representing a “practical middle ground
between completely ad hoc mitigation selection approaches” and “approaches whose
computational complexity requires the use of sophisticated heuristic algorithms.”

Game Theoretic Approaches
Several authors apply game theory to security portfolio selection in combination with
MCDM techniques. (Fielder et al., 2016) employs a pure game theoretic approach in a single
massive two-person non-cooperative zero-sum static game where the defender (person in
charge of choosing controls) competes against an attacker who chooses among various attack
targets. The Nash equilibrium of the game represents the best control portfolio. Recognizing
that the organization may not have sufficient budget to implement the equilibrium of the pure
game, they also discuss a hybrid approach combining game theory with a knapsack strategy.
(Panaousis et al., 2014) model the cybersecurity posture of an organization and then present a
series of non-cooperative control-games where each game is between the defender (a single
control) and the attacker. The Nash equilibria of the games are derived in consideration of
organizational preferences such as costs, anticipated threats, and asset importance. A knapsack
approach is subsequently used to optimize investment in security controls within the
organization’s budget. Finally, (Wang & Zhu, 2016) used evolutionary game theory to
investigate long-term cybersecurity investment strategy finding that firms will invest as long as
either the cost to invest is low or the cost of a breach is high.
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Table F.1. Selected Mitigation Optimization Approaches
Method

Inputs

Analysis Approach

(Barnard & von Solms,

Business analysis

Flow-based control

2000)

Security requirements / policy

selection model

Potential security controls
Evaluation criteria
(Breier & Hudec, 2013)

Asset financial values

GRA combined with

Threats to assets

TOPSIS

Potential countermeasures
Countermeasure cost, efficiency
(El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010)

Assets

Analytic hierarch process

Threats
Controls
Weighted stakeholder judgments
(Fielder et al., 2016)

Threats

Game theory: two-person

Controls

non-cooperative zero-sum

Degrees of control implementation

static game combined
with MCDM knapsack
strategy

(Fenz et al., 2011)

(Gupta et al., 2006)

(Kiesling et al., 2012)

Potential controls

MCDM multi-objective

Risk level of the protected asset

combinatorial

Control attributes such as cost and

optimization (Pareto

effectiveness

efficiency)

Controls

Evolutionary multi-

Cost

objective optimization /

Unmitigated vulnerabilities

genetic algorithms

Assets

MCDM: Pareto efficiency

Threats
Controls
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Method

Inputs

Analysis Approach

(Kiesling et al., 2016)

System architecture (assets, data,

Evolutionary multi-

access)

objective optimization /

Threats and attacker skill level

genetic algorithms

Existing controls
Assets valued according to their
criticality by C/I/A
Candidate mitigations per asset
(Llanso, 2012)

Assets to be protected

Simple additive

Cyber Investment

Incident data related to the assets

weighting: cost/benefit

Analysis Methodology

Potential security controls

algorithm

(CIAM)

Installation and maintenance cost
Control effectiveness
Possible business impacts of cyber
events

(Lv et al., 2011)

Potential security controls

Multi-criteria ranking,

Evaluation criteria (cost,

PROMETHEE

effectiveness, organizational
priorities)
(MITRE, 2017c)

Table of countermeasures per

High to low ranking by

Cyber Risk Remediation

threat

cost

Analysis (RRA)

Cost of countermeasures

(Otero, 2014)

Potential security controls

MCDM: Fuzzy logic /

(implementation cost, scope, extent

fuzzy set theory

of compliance, effectiveness)
(Panaousis et al., 2014)

Potential controls

Game theory non-

Organizational preferences such as

cooperative control-games

costs, anticipated threats, and asset

combined with MCDM

importance

multi-attribute utility
theory
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Method

Inputs

Analysis Approach

(Patterson et al., 2013)

Model of the system under analysis

MCDM

Applicable security controls
Control cost and performance
Risk
Budget
(Rees et al., 2011)

Potential controls

Evolutionary multi-

Control cost

objective optimization /

Residual risk after control

genetic algorithms

Anticipated threats and annual rate
of occurrence
(Sarala et al., 2016)

Potential controls

Evolutionary multi-

Budgetary constraint (maximum

objective optimization /

acceptable control portfolio cost)

genetic algorithms

Anticipated financial loss if threats
left unmitigated
Vulnerabilities
(Sawik, 2013)

Threats

MCDM: bi-objective

Potential mitigations

trade-off model

Expected loss
Budget
Risk tolerance
Potential mitigations
(Schilling & Werners,

Potential controls

MCDM: combinatorial

2016)

Number of controls as a proxy for

optimization

cost
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Method

Inputs

Analysis Approach

(Shapasand et al., 2015)

Potential controls

MCDM: multi-attribute

Cost of maintaining desired levels of

utility theory, knapsack

C/I/A,

model

Profit reduction due to C/I/A
compromise
Penalty cost (e.g. fines, reputation)
due to C/I/A compromise
(Smeraldi & Malacaria,

Mitigations

MCDM: multi-attribute

2014)

Applicability to multiple assets

utility theory, knapsack
model

(Viduto et al., 2012)

Potential mitigations

Evolutionary multi-

Financial costs (purchase,

objective optimization /

operational, training, and labor)

genetic algorithms

Residual risk
(Wang & Zhu, 2016)

Potential controls

Evolutionary game theory

Control cost
Anticipated losses due to
unmitigated cyber breach (including
reputation)
(Weishäupl, 2017)

Potential controls

MCDM: multi-objective

Control costs

optimization

Security level provided by controls
Asset importance
Vulnerability severity per asset
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Method

Inputs

Analysis Approach

(Yevseyeva et al., 2015)

Potential controls

MCDM: quadratic integer

Risk (probability of successful

programming

attack)
Anticipated losses due to cyber
breach
Control effectiveness in reducing
loss
Budget constraint
(Yevseyeva et al., 2016)

Potential controls
Risk
Return (anticipated loss minus
control effectiveness)
Budget constraint

Sharpe ratio

